Based on rumours, this accident gets more strange by the hour:

• RAT deployed
  
• Pilots telling ATC: total loss of thrust
  
• Only survivor is said to have reported, felt like plane was stuck; green and white lights came on in cabin.
  

Source: comments section at bottom of this report (frequently updated; marked yellow). So... just rumours for now:
https://avherald.com/h?article=528f27ec

* Pilots telling ATC: total loss of thrust

The problem with is particular rumour, is it's impossible to find any source for it- it's all just one big circular self-referencing mess.

The closest i've been able to find was a news report from the Hindistan Times, quoting the "civil aviation ministry secretary Samir Kumar Sinha" as saying

“At 1:39 pm, the pilot informed Ahmedabad ATC that it was a Mayday, i.e., full emergency. According to ATC, when it tried to contact the plane, it did not receive any response. Exactly after 1 minute, this plane crashed in Medhaninagar, which is located at a distance of about 2 km from the airport,”

So, officially, one of the pilots radioed "Mayday", and nothing more than that one word.
So it would seem that Maday was called, just the once, with no other information or follow up call.
Yet people continue to post that Mayday, lost power/no thrust/losing power" was called.

The CVR/FDR data can't come soon enough IMHO.

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Grant
Darwin NT

There has been a post of a much higher quality original of one of the videos of the accident. On that you can clearly hear the RAT and even see the RAT deployed. They swept the runway afterwards and did not find parts of birds. There are very few ways to have dual engine failure. Fuel contamination is one, but by now someone else would have gotten bad fuel or it would have been discovered in a routine check. That leaves fuel mismanagement as the other likely cause. Ignoring sabotage and/or maintenance errors.

We need the CVR and FDR and the metallurgy and systems reports.

There has been a post of a much higher quality original of one of the videos of the accident. On that you can clearly hear the RAT and even see the RAT deployed.

The switch to deploy the RAT is in the middle of the overhead panel, and is covered by a flap- it's not something that's going to be done by accident (at least not easily).

Apparently on the 787 the conditions for automatic RAT deployment are-

Failure of both engines
or
Failure of all 3 hydraulic systems
or
Failure of both the pilot & co-pilots primary flight instruments
or
Failure of all 4 electric hydraulic pumps.

We need the CVR and FDR and the metallurgy and systems reports.

Like Yesterday.
Was this a case of something happened, and the crew's response made it worse?
Or was this like QF72- the perfect alignment of near impossible conditions resulting in control data being sent that was thought impossible to occur?

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Grant
Darwin NT

Something new to add to the confusion.

From Flightradar24's blog.

Air India 171 comparative departure paths

We’ve taken data from AI171 departures for the month prior to the accident flight—including two previous operations by VT-ANB—and overlaid their departure paths on the data from AI171 on 12 June. The accident flight is in red, while all other flights are the blue paths. The data shown here is the uncalibrated barometric altitude, so the data is not above ground level, but it is consistent to itself.

Looking at that, it appears that the aircraft actually left the ground earlier than on many of the previous flights, but from the moment it left the ground, it's rate of climb was less than for all of the previous flights (look at the slope of all the blue lines v the red line).

The short sharp upward kink in the accident flight's climb is most likely due to measurement error (although it may not be- the pilots pulled the nose up to try to climb faster???.)
But it looks like the rate of climb was significantly lower than for all other flights- and while it looks like the AoA was unchanged, that could be purely due to the position of the camera at the airfield (foreshortening etc).

But the aircraft left the ground before most of the other flights- and it requires more power to get off the ground that it does to climb at a normal rate (once the undercarriage is retracted and the flaps & slats retracted).
But on this flight the undercarriage wasn't retracted, and the RAT was deployed (which increases drag), and despite much of the noise in forums online, it appears that the slats were set & at least some flaps applied.

This really is a very perplexing crash.

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Grant
Darwin NT

While interesting for speculation, without calibration for takeoff weight and density altitude it is indicative of nothing. However earlier takeoff with higher initial climb rate could indicate someone forgot to fill the fuel tanks.

While interesting for speculation, without calibration for takeoff weight and density altitude it is indicative of nothing. However earlier takeoff with higher initial climb rate could indicate someone forgot to fill the fuel tanks.

For all previous flights on that particular route for the last month? I don't think so.
Remember- regardless of take-off weight and density altitude conditions, the accident flight had one of the earliest take offs, with the lowest climb rate following take off.

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Grant
Darwin NT

For all previous flights on that particular route for the last month? I don't think so.

How much cargo-freight in the belly? Previous flights tankering?

High density altitude will make the engines produce less thrust and a longer ground roll.

the accident flight had one of the earliest take offs, with the lowest climb rate following take off.

Fast to Vr very light. What weight is missing? Mush climb rate when very light. How would these fit together? Fuel mismanagement?

For all previous flights on that particular route for the last month? I don't think so.

How much cargo-freight in the belly? Previous flights tankering?
High density altitude will make the engines produce less thrust and a longer ground roll.

Certainly, different passenger/cargo/fuel load will impact on acceleration. As will air temperature & Relative Humidity will impact on thrust produced

the accident flight had one of the earliest take offs, with the lowest climb rate following take off.

Fast to Vr very light. What weight is missing? Mush climb rate when very light. How would these fit together? Fuel mismanagement?

Or throttle mis-management? Incorrect flight computer data input?
That's what i find so odd about it- particularly fast take off roll and take off, yet poor climb rate, prior to then falling out of the sky... Indicates lots of power, then a big drop in power once off the ground (something similar has happened in the past- but that was an aborted landing attempt, go around initiated, increase in AoA resulting in fuel starvation. But that was a flight running on fumes at the end of a long flight, not the start. And in this case when the plane went down, there was plenty of fuel there as the post-crash file showed).
The first thing that comes to mind for a quick take-off, and poor rate of climb is excessive AoA for the given airspeed. But that doesn't appear to tbe the case here (although the camera angles do make it difficult to judge accurately).


We need solid data.

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Grant
Darwin NT

Well it failed the Wile E. Coyote Test and now it has failed the school bus stop sign test.

Tesla’s Full Self-Driving system fails in ‘safety test’.

Two Tesla foes have joined forces to attack Elon and his automotive semi-autonomous driving technology.

The Dawn Project and the Tesla Takedown movement have partnered to highlight what they claim are “critical safety defects” in Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (Supervised) software.

In a recent test conducted in the United States (US), a Tesla Model Y equipped with the latest version of Full Self-Driving (version 13.2.9) was presented with a common scenario: a school bus stopped on the side of the road with its flashing lights and stop signs activated. A child-sized mannequin was then pulled across the street, simulating a child attempting to catch the bus.

The Tesla, travelling at an average speed of approximately 32 km/h, failed to stop at the bus stop sign and proceeded to strike the mannequin in each of the eight test runs. The system also reportedly failed to alert the driver to the collision.

The tests come as Tesla prepares to launch robotaxis in the US, fully autonomous vehicles designed for taxi services.

While Tesla CEO Elon Musk has stated that the company is “being super paranoid about safety” regarding its forthcoming robotaxi launch, organisers like The Dawn Project and Tesla Takedown aren’t convinced........

Luckily no small children were used for that test.

Crash: India B788 at Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, lost height shortly after takeoff, no thrust reported (updated 2025-06-17_07:23Z)

On Jun 15th 2025 Government Officials reported the aircraft had a longer than normal takeoff run and used almost all of the 3,505 m / 11,499 ft long runway.

Contradicts Grant's post (early takeoff). Don't know if this Flightradar24 diagram is just about the observed climb rate of previous flights or also about the length of the takeoff run.

On Jun 17th 2025 an official, a former Air India Captain trained by the Captain of the accident flight, stated, that the CVR has been successfully read out, the voices on the CVR are very clear. It is becoming gradually clear from the newly emerging evidence that there was probably zero negligence in the cockpit, the crew did not give up until the very last moment. The probability of a technical cause is high. A preliminary report by India's AAIB can be expected in a few days.

On Jun 15th 2025 Government Officials reported the aircraft had a longer than normal takeoff run and used almost all of the 3,505 m / 11,499 ft long runway.

Contradicts Grant's post (early takeoff). Don't know if this Flightradar24 diagram is just about the observed climb rate of previous flights or also about the length of the takeoff run.

If correct it sounds like the tracks on FR24s image aren't aligned in regards to the Take-off points, and only good for comparing the climb rate after take-off.

On Jun 17th 2025 an official, a former Air India Captain trained by the Captain of the accident flight, stated, that the CVR has been successfully read out, the voices on the CVR are very clear. It is becoming gradually clear from the newly emerging evidence that there was probably zero negligence in the cockpit, the crew did not give up until the very last moment.

Unfortunately not giving up to the very last moment doesn't mean they weren't responsible for the initial cause of the accident (not getting up to speed quickly enough can be the result of incorrectly entered data to the Flight Management System, and not getting up to speed quickly enough is a valid reason to abort a take-off), or they didn't follow the SoP when the initial problem(s) occurred, which resulted in a recoverable problem becoming the crash that it was.
But hopefully the CVR data will help in determining what did occur and why.

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Grant
Darwin NT

Crash: India B788 at Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, lost height shortly after takeoff, no thrust reported (updated 2025-06-17_07:23Z)

On Jun 15th 2025 Government Officials reported the aircraft had a longer than normal takeoff run and used almost all of the 3,505 m / 11,499 ft long runway.

As initial reports. However it still points at the crew. Before you begin the roll you have a place a known distance down the runway where if the aircraft isn't a a given speed, say 80 knots, you reject the takeoff because something is wrong. Did they enter the wrong numbers in the FMS? FMS calculates the necessary thrust for the autothrottles. That's right not all takeoff's are done at maximum possible thrust.

I'm wondering when someone will compare the amount of engine noise on one of the videos with a different flight of the same type aircraft. Was it making the expected thrust?

Now that they have the FDR that readout will show us WTF happened. It won't tell us why. The CVR might. However it is the materials examination that should give us the real reason.

Engine noise comparisons are very hard to get right, especially with large turbofans on most modern big jets where few feet, or a few degrees make the apparent noise very different.
Much the same can be said for hearing the RAT.
Just sit back and wait for the first official data release which should be fairly soon after the FDRs have been assessed.

[edited to correct the mobile phone induced typing errors]

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Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

Black Box Recovered From Crash Site, DGCA India Issued Enhanced Safety Measures Following The Air India Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner Crash.

* AAIB Investigators recovered a black box recorder on Friday (Jun 13) from the crash site of the London-bound passenger Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner that crashed into a residential area of India's Ahmedabad city.

* Air India said the plane had been carrying 169 Indian citizens, 53 British nationals, seven Portuguese, and one Canadian.

* The authorities in Ahmedabad asked family members of passengers to submit DNA samples to help identify the bodies.

* Worthy News saw at least one body burned beyond recognition.

* This was the first fatal crash with the Dreamliner since the widebody, twin-engine planes went into service in 2009.

* UK and US air accident investigation agencies are sending teams to support their Indian counterparts.

* DGCA ordered Air India on Friday to "carry out additional maintenance actions" on its fleet of Boeing 787-8/9 Dreamliners equipped with GEnx engines.

Potholes are a plague and a danger here in the UK.

But some who go too far find that fraud is harmful to both pocket and reputation:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpd1x342yq0o

He was also ordered to carry out 300 hours of unpaid work, abide by a 19:00 to 07:00 curfew for six months and pay £30,000 in costs as well as £874 for the fraudulent invoice.

...and he's a personal injury lawyer - I can't help thinking he's just done his professional reputation a bit of an injury.

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Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

Elon's Robocabs are under the spotlight for going rogue.

Less than 24 hours after launching his Robotaxis with much fanfare, Elon Musk’s Tesla has struck trouble with US safety cops.

A day after Tesla shared promotional footage of its new driverless Robotaxi fleet navigating the streets of Austin, Texas, the US government’s top road safety watchdog has stepped in.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) confirmed it has contacted Tesla after reviewing several videos online showing one of the self-driving vehicles veering into the wrong lane and another appearing to exceed the speed limit while overtaking another autonomous vehicle.

The U.S. auto safety agency said it is “aware of the referenced incidents and is in contact with the manufacturer to gather additional information.”

Under the law, the NHTSA does not pre-approve new technologies or vehicle systems.

The NHTSA said the agency investigates incidents involving potential safety defects and that the manufacturer must certify that each vehicle meets NHTSA rigorous safety standards.....

No thanks, I'll walk.

NTSB REPORT: Boeing's Inadequate 'Training, Guidance and Oversight' Led to Mid-Exit Door Plug Blowout on Passenger Jet

WASHINGTON (June 24, 2025) -- The National Transportation Safety Board Tuesday said the probable cause of last year's in-flight mid-exit door (MED) plug blowout on a Boeing 737 MAX 9 was Boeing's failure to "provide adequate training, guidance and oversight" to its factory workers.

The NTSB also found the Federal Aviation Administration was ineffective in ensuring Boeing addressed "repetitive and systemic" nonconformance issues associated with its parts removal process.

The NTSB also concluded that in the two years before the accident, Boeing's voluntary safety management system, or SMS, was inadequate, lacked formal FAA oversight, and did not proactively identify and mitigate risks. The investigation found that accurate and ongoing data about overall safety culture is necessary for an SMS to be successfully integrated into a quality management system.

***

"The safety deficiencies that led to this accident should have been evident to Boeing and to the FAA -- should have been preventable," NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said. "This time, it was missing bolts securing the MED plug. But the same safety deficiencies that led to this accident could just as easily have led to other manufacturing quality escapes and, perhaps, other accidents."

***

The executive summary of the report, including the findings, probable cause and safety recommendations, is available online. Additional material, including the preliminary report, previously issued safety recommendations, news releases, the public docket, investigative updates and links to photos and videos, is available on the accident investigation webpage.

The final report will be published in the coming weeks on NTSB.gov.

Juan Browne reports and comments on another recent NTSB/FAA action:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ws6BXwRngTc

This one is about how the aircraft deals with an out-of-balance event in an engine. The engine is the CFM Leap series, used by both Airbus and Boeing. In the event of something (bid strike) causing the big fan a the front to go out of balance the engine jumps around in a very alarming manner, and must be shut down quickly - on an Airbus this happens automatically; on a 373MAX the crew has to work through a checklist to do it, compounded by which of three or four checklists to run first, the shut-down engine instruction coming several pages into one of those. The NTSB want the FAA to instruct Boeing to update the aircraft software to shut down and make safe the engine (there are a few things affected like HVAC packs having to be stopped, reconfigured, electrical and hydraulic systems reconfigured - this is all "aircraft" side of the engine/aircraft interface).

Juan also has a quick side comment about how pilots on these big aircraft (both Airbus and Boeing) get updates delivered to their i-pads, and don't even get a chance to review them before the update gets "buried" into the existing manual, unlike the good old days of paper updates which one at least had to sort and insert into the bulging handbook. There must be a way of giving pilots a chance to see what's being changed before it is buried.... (Before I retired my employer would send round electronic notification that there were updates to our mountain of manuals, we had to read these, e-sign we'd read them, and then they were added to our electronic manuals bundle - any document that had an outstanding update was tagged as such, and we had a few days to read the update before someone was "reminding" us to do the reading....).

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Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

Ah yes, the folly of updates, especially electronic ones. It will only get worse with AI.