Leaky faucets.

FAA says leaky faucets are a safety problem on Boeing 787s

Regulators are worried that faucet leaks in Boeing 787 jets could pose a safety hazard by water seeping into the planes’ electronics during flights.

The Federal Aviation Administration proposed Friday to order repetitive inspections and, if leaks are found, replacing faucet parts. The move comes after reports of water from lavatories getting under the cabin floor and into electronic equipment bays.

The FAA said the leaks could damage critical equipment and lead to a “loss of continued safe flight and landing.”

The agency said one airline found wet carpet in the cockpit of a plane and, when it inspected its entire fleet of 787s, found “multiple” planes with leaking faucets. The FAA did not identify the airline.

Leaky faucets.

FAA says leaky faucets are a safety problem on Boeing 787s

Regulators are worried that faucet leaks in Boeing 787 jets could pose a safety hazard by water seeping into the planes’ electronics during flights.

The Federal Aviation Administration proposed Friday to order repetitive inspections and, if leaks are found, replacing faucet parts. The move comes after reports of water from lavatories getting under the cabin floor and into electronic equipment bays.

The FAA said the leaks could damage critical equipment and lead to a “loss of continued safe flight and landing.”

The agency said one airline found wet carpet in the cockpit of a plane and, when it inspected its entire fleet of 787s, found “multiple” planes with leaking faucets. The FAA did not identify the airline.

Japanese aircraft parts maker Jamco says on its website that it is the exclusive provider of lavatories for all two-aisle Boeing jets such as the 787.

What other aircraft are they fitted in?

While similar taps may be fitted to other aircraft the exact model is important as even differences that appear "innocent" to mere mortals can be vital to the correct functioning on a particular type or even fleet of aircraft.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

Maybe it's my weird sense of humour, but the name, "Jamco", does inspire confidence with me.

... And those forward toilets are located above the avionics bay that flies the aircraft...

My experience has been that you can never trust plumbers or their plumbing. Especially not in a high vibration area. And especially not at the end of the afternoon. And completely not on a Friday afternoon...

Hopefully Boeing has considered all the what-ifs of all/any leaky pipework?...

Or is the assumption, just as for wiring and earth connections and equipment/instruments grounding, that somehow nothing will ever go wrong?...

(Just like Boeing routed cabling through 747 fuel tanks to blow more than one aircraft out of the sky... Or the dubious wiring bundles that remain unfixed to screw-up the 737 jackscrew to force a rapid descent sometime after 'enough' vibration...?)


Fly safe?
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

While similar taps may be fitted to other aircraft the exact model is important as even differences that appear "innocent" to mere mortals can be vital to the correct functioning on a particular type or even fleet of aircraft.

Quite. Or even a particular batch of O-rings was not properly inspected, or someone mixed up the pass and reject piles.

Don't forget it was a O-ring that brought down a Space Shuttle.

... Don't forget it was a O-ring that brought down a Space Shuttle.

No it wasn't...

It was indeed a set of O-rings that failed. But that was only because the boosters were being twisted by excessive high altitude wind shear.

Had the O-rings not failed first, there was a scary chance that something else structural was going to fail on that reckless launch...

It was management haste and ignorance and an attitude of "Don't Look" that caused that disaster.


Fly safe folks!
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

... Don't forget it was a O-ring that brought down a Space Shuttle.

No it wasn't...

It was indeed a set of O-rings that failed. But that was only because the boosters were being twisted by excessive high altitude wind shear.

NOPE!
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf
page 4 wrote:

The Committee commends the work of the Rogers Commission and its supporting panels at NASA. Their investigation and the reports that document their efforts are very broad in scope and exceptionally detailed considering the time that was available to accomplish their task.
As a rule, the Committee agrees with the findings reached by the Rogers Commission. However, there are areas where the Committee either disagrees with a Rogers Commission finding or with the relative importance that the Rogers Commission attached to that finding.

page 12 wrote:

F. ADDITIONAL AVENUES OF INVESTIGATION
Issue
Could the accident have been caused by some failure other than failure of the joint between the casings?
Finding
As of September 15, 1986, the Committee has not found any credible evidence to support any cause of the Challenger accident, other than the failure of the aft casings joint in the right-hand Solid Rocket Booster. Nor has there been any substantial evidence of a secondary or parallel failure on Flight 51-L.

https://sma.nasa.gov/SignificantIncidents/assets/rogers_commission_report.pdf
page 20 wrote:

At approximately 37 seconds, Challenger encountered the first of several high-altitude wind shear conditions, which lasted until about 64 seconds. The wind shear created forces on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These were immediately sensed and countered by the guidance, navigation and control system. Although flight 51-L loads exceeded prior experience in both yaw and pitch planes at certain instants, the maxima had been encountered on previous flights and were within design limits.

Well below high altitude
page19 wrote:

During this prerelease "twang" motion, structural loads are stored in the assembled structure. These loads are released during the first few seconds of flight in a structural vibration mode at a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The maximum structural loads on the aft field joints of the Solid Rocket Boosters occur during the "twang," exceeding even those of the maximum dynamic pressure period experienced later in flight.
...
Just after liftoff at .678 seconds into the flight, photographic data show a strong puff of gray smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster.
...
Eight more distinctive puffs of increasingly blacker smoke were recorded between .836 and 2.500 seconds.
...
The multiple smoke puffs in this sequence occurred at about four times per second, approximating the frequency of the structural load dynamics and resultant joint flexing.

Thanks for those good references.


See also:

Viewpoint: Challenger and the misunderstanding of risk
wrote:

... The Challenger was lost because one small part - an O-ring seal - failed during a launch in cold weather. The possibility of this part failing had been predicted long before, but Nasa managers chose to ignore the concerns...

... Before Challenger's final mission - listed as 51-L - it was known that the O-ring seals on a previous flight - 51-C - had eroded...

My recollection is that the increased stresses on the boosters opened up an already compromised O-ring that then led to the irreversible burn through...


Hopefully, we now have modern day managers that are better aware?...

Fly safe folks!
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

... And those forward toilets are located above the avionics bay that flies the aircraft...

Scarily so!...

See:

FAA addresses water leaks on Boeing 787 flight equipment
wrote:

... forced to act following reports ‘of a loss of water pressure during flight and water leaks that affected multiple pieces of electronic equipment’...

... that caused water to migrate into the forward electronic equipment (EE) bay...

... Furthermore, the aircraft lost water pressure while in flight.

The failure to use and correctly install the relevant couplings could ‘result in water leaks and water migration to critical flight equipment, which may affect the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane,’ the FAA concluded...

So... The Boeing 787 is dependent upon a visual inspection before every flight to then hope that there is no water leak during flight that may well become another of one of those single critical points of failure...

All for the sake of some water pipework not being safely segregated from the electronics?!!!

Even for the sake ground based domestic housing over here, all plumbing is kept away from the gas and electricity services...


What happened to flight safety?...

Fly safe??
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

What happened to flight safety?...

So I looked a a few different 787-x seating charts. Every airline is wildly different as is -8, -9, -10 on the same airline. I'd say the operator is the one deciding to put water pipes above electronics. Rule #1, the customer (operator - airline) is always right.

Another 737 Max problem.

Boeing halts deliveries of some 737 MAXs amid new supplier problem

WASHINGTON, April 13 (Reuters) - Boeing (BA.N) has halted deliveries of some 737 MAXs as it grapples with a new supplier quality problem by Spirit AeroSystems (SPR.N) that could stretch back to 2019, the U.S. planemaker disclosed on Thursday.
The issue will likely affect a "significant" number of undelivered 737 MAX airplanes both in production and in storage, and could result in lowered 737 MAX deliveries in the near term, the company said.
...
The problem, which affects a portion of the 737 MAX family of airplanes, including the MAX 7, MAX 8 and MAX 8200 airplanes as well as the P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft based on the 737 NG, is not a safety of flight issue and in-service planes can continue to operate, Boeing said.
...
The problem involves the installation of two fittings that join the aft fuselage made by Spirit to the vertical tail, which were not attached correctly to the structure of the fuselage before it was sent to Boeing. Certain versions of the aircraft, like the MAX 9, use fittings from different suppliers and were correctly installed.

I'm not sure I understand the "not a safety problem" and "attaching the tail section to the main fuselage"

Another 737 Max problem...

... I'm not sure I understand the "not a safety problem" and "attaching the tail section to the main fuselage"

Worryingly...

Blancolirio: 737Max Update! 14 Apr 23
wrote:

... vertical stabilizer attach fittings...

Two apt comments in the comments section are:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3qnEKV51bM&lc=UgzOm80_yXuVRW3WJ-t4AaABAg wrote:

... It’s pretty scary the whole process seems to be a can of worms all in the name of the dollar! How many other safety issues are being missed ?...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3qnEKV51bM&lc=UgwbQ80fcoJcoLBXu2V4AaABAg wrote:

... the bolt holes (2 each) of the fitting in question, we’re not to spec. . . But that’s just guessing. . . What’s distressing is treating this as a repair issue in/during the manufacturing process. . . Repair manuals are for ‘after the fact,’ not during. . . This is more a non conforming part issue...

So...

Overly cheap parts missing out on some of the required manufacturing/production steps?

Or "surely some mistake" that has nearly sneaked through?...

Either way, from my following of this little story, how is it that securing the tail fin in place is, according to Boeing, 'somehow' not a critical safety issue?...

Whatever did happen to those Boeing QA inspectors?...


Fly safe?
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

You have no idea how the part is different that the original specifications. You can not tell if it is stronger or weaker then the specifications. For all you know the part has an extra useless out of the way tab on it. Only the FAA and Boeing know that now, but once the service bulletin comes out perhaps then the rest of us will know.

If you want to bitch, bitch about a QA system that accepted the parts and allowed them to be installed. No incoming inspection to see if it was the part the documents said it was?

You have no idea how the part is different that the original specifications. You can not tell if it is stronger or weaker then the specifications. For all you know the part has an extra useless out of the way tab on it. Only the FAA and Boeing know that now, but once the service bulletin comes out perhaps then the rest of us will know.

If you want to bitch, bitch about a QA system that accepted the parts and allowed them to be installed. No incoming inspection to see if it was the part the documents said it was?

I've a lot of experience with non-conformant parts and those suppliers who somehow believe they know better than the original design and specifications...

The critical aspect is that non-conformant parts are not to the expected specification. They are different. And those differences usually have consequences...


The proper route and method to follow to ensure that a part that is to be supplied/manufactured can be different from the existing specs is to update the specs to allow for that part. That also requires responsibility is taken that all/any consequences have been considered and tested for...

Anything less and... Oh... We have examples of catastrophic failures due to that...


And wasn't it Boeing that got rid of most (all?) of their QA people and hoped that the FAA was too busy elsewhere to notice?...

After all... Following good QA practices slows down getting things out of the door...


Fly safely?
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

... The issue will likely affect a "significant" number of undelivered 737 MAX airplanes both in production and in storage, and could result in lowered 737 MAX deliveries...

Am I blind or is it that there is no similar repeated cascades of seemingly continuously ongoing faulty manufacturing for other airline manufacturers?

Should Boeing get grounded again until they demonstrably improve their deadly greedy ways to be safely less deadly?...


Fly safe folks?
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

Should Boeing get grounded again until they demonstrably improve their deadly greedy ways to be safely less deadly?...

Is it Boeing, or is it the smaller and smaller government politicians who have unfunded the FAA?

Further note:

... The critical aspect is that non-conformant parts are not to the expected specification. They are different. And those differences usually have consequences...


The proper route and method to follow to ensure that a part that is to be supplied/manufactured can be different from the existing specs is to update the specs to allow for that part. That also requires responsibility is taken that all/any consequences have been considered and tested for...

Anything less and... Oh... We have examples of catastrophic failures due to that...

... And note for this example, Boeing has opted to replace (or as euphemistically(?) described, somehow "repair",) the non-conformant part rather than to update the specifications to show that the new part is safe...


Judge for yourselves...

Fly safe folks?
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

Should Boeing get grounded again until they demonstrably improve their deadly greedy ways to be safely less deadly?...

Is it Boeing, or is it the smaller and smaller government politicians who have unfunded the FAA?

My own personal view is that it is Boeing Directors 'gaming' the system, regardless of all other people and safety and Boeing being damned...

Also: Should not the FAA be in there as 'Auditors' rather than having to act as the daily QA solely for Boeing?...


Fly safe?...
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

My own personal view is that it is Boeing Directors 'gaming' the system, regardless of all other people and safety and Boeing being damned...

Are they not legally required to do so? The fiduciary duty to the shareholder to maximize profit by ANY means possible.

Also: Should not the FAA be in there as 'Auditors' rather than having to act as the daily QA solely for Boeing?...

There is no other company making aircraft for part 121 operations in FAA land.