To my personal view, there is a lot of disrepute to overcome there...

Contentious to say the least...unless you intend to state them.
Many have said that Boeing has in effect, certified themselves for years. A leading civil aviation expert has been told that many in the FAA were pressurised by their own managers.
Boeing has for years been subsidised by the States, yet when this has been brought by the RotW, they were informed that the "federal government" does not subsidise industry, which is correct, they don't - The individual States do, what a get out of jail card!
Now I'm wondering about that pilot in your post - WAS he forced to resign because he was too outspoken with his facts?

To my personal view, there is a lot of disrepute to overcome there...

Contentious to say the least...unless you intend to state them.
Many have said that Boeing has in effect, certified themselves for years. A leading civil aviation expert has been told that many in the FAA were pressurised by their own managers.
Boeing has for years been subsidised by the States, yet when this has been brought by the RotW, they were informed that the "federal government" does not subsidise industry, which is correct, they don't - The individual States do, what a get out of jail card!
Now I'm wondering about that pilot in your post - WAS he forced to resign because he was too outspoken with his facts?

I think that you've already stated the concerns for the disrepute...

Add also that the FAA had its funding cut...

And also that Boeing had/have dismissed a large number of their Quality Assurance people...


Profits 1st at all costs...

All badly silly and costly, in this case, in human lives...


All in our only one world,
Martin

NB: I'm certainly not flying anything Boeing until at least a year after all this has satisfactorily settled down. Also good for the planet even if my travel may well be a little curtailed...

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
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My apologies Martin, I misread it - thought you were saying my post was disreputable.

... And that latest snippet has hit the main media:

Boeing informs FAA about improperly manufactured parts on some passenger planes

[...]

Again, also it looks like the present certification system is not working as it should... Due to cutting costs to boost greedy profits?

Would those faulty parts have been found without the glare from the loss of TWO Boeing aircraft and the death of all onboard?

What other too-cheaply-made or cost-cutting parts are Boeing flying?... All unchecked??...


All in our only one world,
Martin

NB: I'm certainly not flying anything Boeing until at least a year after all this has satisfactorily settled down. Also good for the planet even if my travel may well be a little curtailed...

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

My apologies Martin, I misread it - thought you were saying my post was disreputable.

Ahhh... The ambiguity of which "there"!

"There" in that case indeed was for the subject and actors of the statements. Not the messenger!

Good to clear up - thanks.


All in our only one world,
Martin

NB: I'm certainly not flying anything Boeing until at least a year after all this has satisfactorily settled down. Also good for the planet even if my travel may well be a little curtailed...

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

I like Boeings, but I won't be flying any 737 Max's in the near or distant future. :-)
As for your question, if Boeing go ahead with cutting huge numbers of quality control staff, one can expect many more such reports.

Another take on the background to the Boeing rush and the design compromises pushed:



Boeing Was ‘Go, Go, Go’ to Beat Airbus With the 737 Max

Boeing faced an unthinkable defection in the spring of 2011. American Airlines, an exclusive Boeing customer for more than a decade, was ready to place an order for hundreds of new, fuel-efficient jets from the world’s other major aircraft manufacturer, Airbus...

... The [MCAS] software was meant to compensate for bigger, more fuel-efficient engines and ensure the plane flew the same way as an earlier version...

... At the heart of Boeing’s push was a focus on creating a plane that was essentially the same as earlier 737 models, important for getting the jet certified quickly. It would also help limit the training that pilots would need, cutting down costs for airlines.

Rick Ludtke, an engineer who helped design the 737 Max cockpit and spent 19 years at Boeing, said the company had set a ground rule for engineers: Limit changes to hopefully avert a requirement that pilots spend time training in a flight simulator before flying the Max.

“Any designs we created could not drive any new training that required a simulator,” Mr. Ludtke said. “That was a first.”

When upgrading the cockpit with a digital display, he said, his team wanted to redesign the layout of information to give pilots more data that were easier to read. But that might have required new pilot training.

So instead, they simply recreated the decades-old gauges on the screen. “We just went from an analog presentation to a digital presentation,” Mr. Ludtke said. “There was so much opportunity to make big jumps, but the training differences held us back.”

“This program was a much more intense pressure cooker than I’ve ever been in,” he added. “The company was trying to avoid costs...



Read into that what you will... To rework an old engineering saying: "Safety-critical, robust, fast (cheap): Choose which two you require..."


All in our only one world,
Martin

NB: I'm certainly not flying anything Boeing until at least a year after all this has satisfactorily settled down. Also good for the planet even if my travel may well be a little curtailed...

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

Wikipedia gives good background with the history behind the 737 and how it has been transformed over the decades and multiple versions...


Wikipedia - Boeing 737

... The 737 was originally envisioned in 1964. The initial 737-100 made its first flight in April 1967, and entered airline service in February 1968...



And the present grounding of the 737 Max is detailed separately on:

Wikipedia - Boeing 737 MAX groundings

... The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General opened an investigation into FAA approval of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft series, focusing on potential failures in the safety-review and certification process. The day after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, a federal grand jury issued a subpoena on behalf of the U.S. Justice Department for documents related to development of the 737 MAX...

... In the view of the FAA, as stated to Congress by its Acting Administrator Dan Elwell, the MCAS is not an anti-stall system...



In my personal-uneducated-humble-engineering opinion:

I strongly suspect that the "anti-stall" description will have to change in that MCAS was conscripted to intervene at multiple variations of high thrust, high speed AND low speed flight. Really, can a pilot operating the control column alone, recover from all stall scenarios with those oversized engine cowlings protruding so far in front of the wing?

And why were vortex generators[*] deemed to be a no-go as a fix for the unwanted aerodynamics of the engine cowlings??


All haste and greed? And others' lives be damned?

All in our only one world,
Martin


[*]: See: Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 Max, Blind to a Late Design Change

But the plane wasn’t flying smoothly, partly because of the Max’s bigger engines. To fix the issue, Boeing decided to use a piece of software [MCAS]. The system was meant to work in the background, so pilots effectively wouldn’t know it was there.

Mr. Craig, who had been with Boeing since 1988, didn’t like it, according to one person involved in the testing. An old-school pilot, he eschewed systems that take control from pilots and would have preferred an aerodynamic fix such as vortex generators, thin fins on the wings. But engineers who tested the Max design in a wind tunnel weren’t convinced they would work...

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

3: Aircraft have redundant systems in place to cover failures. Where was the redundant system for the trim stabilisers?

Right onboard the aircraft. And you know that. You have even commented on it. It is how the plane Ethiopian plane was controlled on the previous flight where the failed AoA sensor was reported to maintenance to fix, which they obviously didn't!

At least some posts later your true agenda, tax breaks, has become clear.

Right on-board the aircraft and not being used.....

That's not real redundancy - there was only one sensor in use at the time of the crash, and that sensor was faulty. In one respect it makes no odds if maintenance replaced that sensor, or tested it and found no fault or did nothing if there had been proper redundancy in action the fault would have been detected (again) and MCAS cut out of the command loop, the pilot notified and (if the fault occurred during the flight) fly the plane without the aid of MCAS. The truth is that relying on only one sensor at a time is almost as bad as only having one sensor in the first place, because you have a none-redundant system.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

3: Aircraft have redundant systems in place to cover failures. Where was the redundant system for the trim stabilisers?

Right onboard the aircraft. And you know that. You have even commented on it. It is how the plane Ethiopian plane was controlled on the previous flight where the failed AoA sensor was reported to maintenance to fix, which they obviously didn't!

At least some posts later your true agenda, tax breaks, has become clear.

I never expected to see you become a B/S'er. What "true agenda"? MCAS disabled the electrical powered controlled trim stabilisers. I suggest you read the post in its entirety & you will see that I SAID that "manual operation" was imho, not a redundant backup.
Edit: With ALL the interesting posts & links they have provided, ONE THING I have not seen mentioned YET. The MCAS "patch" does that still cut the power to the trim stabilisers or has that option been disabled?
I suggest you look into that as you come across as you are so much closer to the problem than what we are.

@rob/bob Is a "trim stabilisers" an "AoA sensor"? No. Try to follow the conversation.

MCAS disabled the electrical powered controlled trim stabilisers.

No. Didn't do that at all and can't. Suggest you find out what it does do and can't do and what it uses and what the suggested emergency procedures are.

I suggest you read the post in its entirety & you will see that I SAID that "manual operation" was imho, not a redundant backup.

IMHO is fine, but you obviously don't understand aircraft control systems. Here is a question for you. Suppose it was the switch on the pilot's yoke that stuck sending trim down to the "trim stabilisers" and not MCAS? Then what? Turn off the electric motor that is driving down "trim stabilisers" and use the manual backup. That's what.
BTW on some aircraft the electric trim motor actually drives the manual control wheel.

Edit: With ALL the interesting posts & links they have provided, ONE THING I have not seen mentioned YET. The MCAS "patch" does that still cut the power to the trim stabilisers or has that option been disabled?

There is a switch on the instrument panel to turn off the electric motors that drive the "trim stabilisers" Ethiopian pilots turned if off as they were supposed to. Then for "inexplicable reasons" turned it back on.

BTW there isn't a thing called a "trim stabilisers". There is a trim tab which is driven by a manual control wheel and an electric motor. The tab operates in the opposite direction of the entire horizontal stabilizer. So it pitches the tab up to force the entire surface down and vice versa. When the pilot moves the control yoke which is attached to the entire surface, the trim tab moves in the other direction. Fun stuff.

BTW there is also such a tab for yaw. Not much used except when you are flying with one engine out. Roll trim is usually handled by the autopilot and adjusting the fuel weight in the wings.

You mean like the "conversation" between Boeing and the FAA?

So you want exactness, well here it is!

If true, the pilots initially followed steps Boeing has long said enable crew to address unwanted MCAS activation. The steps, which Boeing highlighted following last year's crash of a Lion Air 737 Max 8, include electrically adjusting the stabiliser using trim switches on the control column, shutting off electric trim altogether and reverting to manual trim using the trim wheel in the cockpit.

BOEING is liable, regardless of whatever you continue to say. The pilots followed Boeings procedures....
....oops, wait a minute? What procedures? Hardly any knew about MCAS. In fact, Boeings Chief Technical Pilot requested the FAA to remove MCAS from pilots checklists....oh dear.
You'd perform well in a court fighting Boeings corner. :-)
Question, if MCAS has nothing to do with the "trim tab" WHY does Boeing suggest to turn it off?
Why can't you admit that MCAS was not fit for purpose especially with only 1 AoA sensor.
BTW, the trim tab stabilises if your description is correct, after all, an aircraft must be stable or "funny things" happen like diving into the ground or sea.

There is ONE trim stabiliser lead-screw on the B737MAX, it is normally electrically driven, and is controlled either by the use of the trim toggles on the yoke, or by the MCAS system. It has a manual fall-back system which relies on the two trim-wheels, one on either side of the central console. While this may appear to be "redundant", aerodynamic loads can make the use of these wheels impossible for a single pilot, or indeed for both crew members working in unison, to rotate quickly enough. Now, if both pilots are trying to turn the trim wheels who is flying the plane one may ask.... That is not a proper redundant system. But in these two crashes the function of the actual jack is not really in question.

There is a separate breaker for the toggles, which interrupts the signal from the toggle to the trim control system - I believe here is one for each yoke, but I'm not certain about that.

Isolating MCAS does remove the power to the lead-screw jack, and thus disables the yoke toggles. Or at least it did when first implemented on the B737Max.

One possible (probable??) reason for the Ethiopian pilots re-setting the MCAS isolation toggles was to get power back onto the trim jack.

As far as I understand part of what might be called "MCAS-2" is that the power is no longer cut to the trim jack, thus the toggles can still be used. This part of the change will obviously require some work on the power distribution and management systems.

The small tabs on the elevators are there to reduce the effort needed to move the elevator, not to trim the aircraft. Trim is accomplished by altering the angle of the whole stabiliser.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

One thing to remember is that the B737Max is not the only aircraft to have large engines mounted high and forward - take a look at the A320, A330, A350, B757, B767, B777, B787........
The B737Max can be flown without MCAS active and is stable and safe. But it does mean that the pilots have to pay more attention to speed and attitude than they would do in an earlier generation B737. HOWEVER it is (was) not a simple task to isolate MCAS without affecting other systems, thus was rarely done (and one would hope that it will become simpler in the future....).

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

Ignoring the fatal events that have taken place, I've highlighted the biggest elephant in the room & yet to see anyone pick up on it.

2011
Boeing went for a re-engineering of the 737 as it would only be 10-15% of a new program estimated at $10-12 billion.

2014
Boeing CEO stated that the 737 would be replaced by a new program in 2030.

2030
The costs of that new program would be cheaper than the costs of 2011?

The airline industry has to put up with Boeing's "patches" to keep the 737 flying for another 11 years (let's hope there is no more fatal events regarding that aircraft)? What planet are these muppets living on? It certainly isn't this one!

There is ONE trim stabiliser lead-screw on the B737MAX, it is normally electrically driven, and is controlled either by the use of the trim toggles on the yoke, or by the MCAS system. It has a manual fall-back system which relies on the two trim-wheels, one on either side of the central console. While this may appear to be "redundant", aerodynamic loads can make the use of these wheels impossible for a single pilot, or indeed for both crew members working in unison, to rotate quickly enough. Now, if both pilots are trying to turn the trim wheels who is flying the plane one may ask.... That is not a proper redundant system. But in these two crashes the function of the actual jack is not really in question.

Yes. And there are many skilled Boeing pilots that have pointed that problem out.
The upcoming "software upgrade" of the MCAS will however soon fix the problem as we are told...

For the past 50 years, there has been too much "short term gain" without thinking of the "long term pain".
A classic case & one which now tops the leaderboard is:
Boeing
2011 short term gain
2018/19 long term pain.