Go back many many pages in the thread and find the posts from several persons pointing to the ASRS reports, or search the ASRS database yourself.

Please enlighten us with a few (five?) examples?

Was done a long time ago. You even commented upon it, to damn Boeing of course. Now that your comments are being put into perspective ... .

Again, search the database. Might try 737MAX as aircraft type and runaway trim and/or AoA as being mentioned.

why were these incidents not followed up to save hundreds of lives?

What makes you think that the reports were not followed up on?

Or should that be, why do you demand instant action and perfection from humans?

United Airlines pulls Boeing 737 MAX from schedule until Sept 4

CHICAGO, Feb 14 (Reuters) - United Airlines Holdings Inc said on Friday it is extending the cancellation of Boeing 737 MAX flights until Sept. 4, a fresh delay that comes as sources told Reuters that the timing of a key certification flight may not happen until at least April.

U.S. airlines that operate Boeing Co’s 737 MAX, which was grounded worldwide last March after two fatal crashes, had last pulled the jet from their flight schedules until early June. On Thursday, Southwest Airlines Co extended its MAX cancellations until Aug. 10. (Reporting by Tracy Rucinski Editing by Chizu Nomiyama)

additional quote from WaPo

The software fix and new requirements for pilot training must be approved by the FAA before the plane is allowed to resume flying. Speaking to reporters in Singapore this week, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson said there is no set timeline for returning the plane to service, Reuters reported.

A spokesman for Boeing said the company continues to work through the recertification process.

“With safety as our highest priority, we are working with regulators to appropriately address all certification requirements and safely return the [plane] to service,” said Peter P. Pedraza, a Boeing spokesman.

Have you actually tried a search - 737 max (and variations there-on) return zero results.
737-800 returns 6 possible results that, on examination, show ZERO results.
There were a few PRESS reports where flight crew comments included things like "We didn't know about MCAS" and "We know about MCAS and had a little training about it", "We know about it, but not enough to trust it". These press reports implied that some of these flight crew reports had been made to their companies, but the question has to be asked - did they ever get beyond the airlines into the database? On the face of it the answer is "No", but they could be buried in some dark corner.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

Thanks for confirming.

Yep... A totally useless wasteful wild goose chase chasing up the garden path for a useless giggle.


And the point of all that was?...

All in our subversive deadly greedy world...
Martin

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Have you actually tried a search - 737 max (and variations there-on) return zero results.

737-max is not supported as a search term. Max8 seems to be under 737-800 in ASRS, but include 737 undifferentiated.

737-800 returns 6 possible results that, on examination, show ZERO results.

https://setiathome.berkeley.edu/forum_thread.php?id=78677&postid=1984910#1984910 These? (From March 2019 - as I said long time ago.)

A search I just ran came up with 100+ ACN's which I looked through some, several indicating run-away trim issues, none I looked at indicated anything worse than overweight landing accomplished.

That is the point. Getting head down in checklists and forgetting to fly first (Aviate, Navigate, and Communicate). That is even mentioned in more than one of the ACN's.

Boeing's assumption was that an AoA induced MCAS failure should seem similar enough to a runaway trim that is how a crew would react to it as such and doing the first should be in human brain emergency step - turn off the electric trim - would result in a controllable aircraft. That assumption does not seem to have been an issue for US pilots as they mostly come up through the ranks and aren't transitioning directly from a Cessna to a 737. The assumption was unwarranted for foreign budget air carrier pilots.

That lead to another question, should Boeing have to require that come up through the ranks training before you can sit in the left or right seat or is that the responsibility of the aviation authority in whatever country is granting the ATP license?

With the fixes to MCAS it is obvious that will require some add on type training.

The Boeing 737 deadly saga continues:

FAA faces dilemma over 737 MAX wiring flaw that Boeing missed


Read and judge for yourselves...

All in our deadly greedy world,
Martin

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The Boeing 737 deadly saga continues:

Troubled 737 MAX Boeing airplane had at least 13 other safety incidents...


Read and judge for yourselves...

All in our deadly greedy world,
Martin

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FAA faces dilemma over 737 MAX wiring flaw that Boeing missed

Wiring flaw? Well fly by wire comes to mind. Wiring flaws are not supposed to happen.

How many more problems are there to find?
737 Max: Debris found in planes' fuel tanks

Boeing's crisis-hit 737 Max jetliner faces a new potential safety issue as debris has been found in the fuel tanks of several of the planes.
The head of Boeing's 737 programme has told employees that the discovery was "absolutely unacceptable".

I've just watched Blancoliro discussing the wiring problem on his Patreon channel. It would appear that the regulations that apply to how the cabling on an aircraft date back a long way, and do not adequately cope with the shear amount of cabling on a modern aircraft, particularly one this is a development on a much older one. On first listen it sounds as though the cable spacing between types of cable (data, power, control etc.) depends on wen the parent design was first certified, and the 737 was certified a long time ago so those are the spacings that are mandated. From the sound of it those spacings are a bit close for today's aircraft environment, but they do comply with the regulations so Boeing saw no need to change the cable runs when moving from the Classic to the NG, then from the NG to the MAX, because the regulations said they were OK.
I also know that in other industries so long as you are in continuous series build of a particular "model" (and I would take "model" to mean 737-100, and 737-200 to be a different model) you don't have to comply with the current at date of build regulations, but if you build a new model then that model has to comply with the regulations applicable at the date of design.
This sounds to be a case of the regulations themselves not being up to the job, so "assisting" a manufacturer not to have to do some parts of design work when introducing new models.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

I've just watched Blancoliro discussing the wiring problem on his Patreon channel. It would appear that the regulations that apply to how the cabling on an aircraft date back a long way, and do not adequately cope with the shear amount of cabling on a modern aircraft, particularly one this is a development on a much older one. On first listen it sounds as though the cable spacing between types of cable (data, power, control etc.) depends on wen the parent design was first certified, and the 737 was certified a long time ago so those are the spacings that are mandated. From the sound of it those spacings are a bit close for today's aircraft environment, but they do comply with the regulations so Boeing saw no need to change the cable runs when moving from the Classic to the NG, then from the NG to the MAX, because the regulations said they were OK.
I also know that in other industries so long as you are in continuous series build of a particular "model" (and I would take "model" to mean 737-100, and 737-200 to be a different model) you don't have to comply with the current at date of build regulations, but if you build a new model then that model has to comply with the regulations applicable at the date of design.
This sounds to be a case of the regulations themselves not being up to the job, so "assisting" a manufacturer not to have to do some parts of design work when introducing new models.

And then there is the reality that at least two aircraft have suffered 'accidents' due to failed/damaged power cables, hence the subsequent improved cabling requirements.

For the sake of arguing old outdated regulations vs good sensible safe design vs the risk of suffering a deadly uncontrollable aircraft for the sake of a few feet of badly placed cable...


In an earlier article, Boeing are claiming the usual lame excuses for fixing the Boeing 737 cabling of "too expensive" and "can't be done"... The reality is:

• If the cables really are so fragile that they can't be disturbed, then why are they so fragile? Is that not in itself dangerous to normal vibration damage??
  
  
• And even if somehow access is not practical, then the fix is to abandon whichever cables and run new cables along a safe route.
  

All a game of greedy profits and people be damned?

All in our only one deadly greedy world,
Martin

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I've just re-watched the Blanoliro video, he states that over the years he's been flying (about 30 from memory) he's had a couple of short circuits or cross feeds on other aircraft types, including one on an MD11 where it sounds as if he was lucky not to suffer a crash, the power to the stabiliser failed just as he was trimming to land, and he had to "brute force" the plane into something like a reasonable landing attitude and got away with a hot landing. So this sort of fault isn't only in Boeing's purview, but other manufactures have had similar issues over the years. (And in my view always will suffer from them so long as the wiring segregation rules don't keep up with the technologies in today's aircraft.)

As I understand it, in the aircraft industry if you depart from the applicable set of regulations, i.e. those in place at the time of type design/first manufacture, you may be liable in the event of an accident. This is a rather backward way of doing things given the rate of developments in aircraft technology in recent years as with each new major variant on a type it should be the regulations in place at the design/first build of the variant that applies. Just think for a moment how much power is required for all the new passenger-facing services on a modern plane compared to that for an equivalent one fifty years ago, and then add on all the additional stuff that is there for the various radar, radio, navigation etc. that bedecks an airliner today.

There is probably virtually no cost difference in between adding the "new" cables to an existing bundle (at the design stage) compared to designing a new loom given the number of changes to the actual physical layout of equipment and structure. I doubt that there is one loom on a B737-700 that is common with a B737-200.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

I've just re-watched the Blanoliro video, he states that over the years he's been flying (about 30 from memory) he's had a couple of short circuits or cross feeds on other aircraft types, including one on an MD11 where it sounds as if he was lucky not to suffer a crash...

As I understand it, in the aircraft industry if you depart from the applicable set of regulations, i.e. those in place at the time of type design/first manufacture, you may be liable in the event of an accident...

Are not the various regulations a set of minimum requirements?

And cannot those minimums be exceeded for the sake of good design and increased safety margin?


Another Boeing 737 example that comes to mind for today's standards/requirements is the inadequate separation of the control cables for the wing and tail control surfaces. For that example I can have some sympathy about the problems of rerouting them to meet today's improved standards.

However:

• Why were the new safer standards not insisted upon nor implemented for each iteration of the aircraft models?
  
  
• And also at the very least for the existing aircraft, why is no protection retrofitted to protect the common vulnerable areas of those cables?
  

All a part of our deadly greedy world?
Martin

Note to avoid confusion: The 'cables' described here for the control surfaces are mechanical wire cables as opposed to electrical wiring cables/bundles.

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One of the largest issues with cable looms is the loom itself. Every place you tie the cables physically together is another potential point of failure. The compression introduces stress, bends the conductors and damages the insulation. Every bulkhead it goes through and every hanger is a place where it can rub.

Unfortunately airplanes flex. The cables have to move relative to the air frame. At some point they will fail. You just have to design in enough extra that the cables can take the damage over the life of the aircraft.

As to different cables too close to each other, that is a cross talk issue. Like using Cat 4 cable instead of Cat 5e cable. A short run will work, a long run won't. There are some basic principles as to how far apart they should be and that translates into how many different cable looms will be required.

The issue isn't really an aircraft engineering issue as much as an electrical and mechinical engineering issue.

One of the largest issues with cable looms is the loom itself. Every place you tie the cables physically together is another potential point of failure. The compression introduces stress, bends the conductors and damages the insulation. Every bulkhead it goes through and every hanger is a place where it can rub.

Unfortunately airplanes flex. The cables have to move relative to the air frame. At some point they will fail. You just have to design in enough extra that the cables can take the damage over the life of the aircraft.

As to different cables too close to each other, that is a cross talk issue. Like using Cat 4 cable instead of Cat 5e cable. A short run will work, a long run won't. There are some basic principles as to how far apart they should be and that translates into how many different cable looms will be required.

True enough except that for the Boeing 737 electrical cables danger, the potentially killer problem is that of 'hot' power cables being run along with the electrical control cables for the tail trim actuator. A short circuit to that control cable due to rubbing, flexing, pinch damage, overload of the power cable, or whatever, can activate the trim to run to the endstops and will also bypass the trim kill switches in the cockpit. No recovery possible from that...

The issue isn't really an aircraft engineering issue as much as an electrical and mechinical engineering issue.

This is very much an "aircraft engineering issue" in that the 'issue' will kill people.

Even more at issue is for how, for the Boeing 737 example, a safe fix is purely mechanical and low tech...


All in our deadly greedy world,
Martin

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See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
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As to different cables too close to each other, that is a cross talk issue.

Isn't it also a 'common mode failure' issue? If both parts of a redundant loom can be severed by the same stray fan blade (or whatever), you are, yet again, in deep doo-doo.

Martin, that is actually two failures. Failure of the power cable and failure of the actuator cable.

As to different cables too close to each other, that is a cross talk issue.

Isn't it also a 'common mode failure' issue? If both parts of a redundant loom can be severed by the same stray fan blade (or whatever), you are, yet again, in deep doo-doo.

Yes, but if you have two control lines, which one should you believe?
Or you could have fan blade short the cable to another so as soon as power goes down the line the wrong thing moves. Best to keep the fan blades inside the engine.
Defending against a fan blade into the fuselage is about the same as defending against a surface to air missile shrapnel into the fuselage. How often does it happen, how much additional weight for redundancy, how much operational cost, how much global warming, etc.

... that is actually two failures. Failure of the power cable and failure of the actuator cable.

Still a deadly critical failure, regardless of any or all of:

• Insulation worn away or otherwise broken between the two in-contact wires due to whatever reason;
  
• Insulation destroyed by heat due to an overload on the power cable that then causes shorting to other wires;
  
• A broken/damaged fixing pinching/piercing the insulation to then short out the wires;
  
• Any other scenario of vulnerability due to the multiple critical wires being in the same place in the same cable bundle!
  

Regardless of ignorance and lame excuses, that known silliness should simply not be risked. All the more so when there is a simple easy fix.

All in our all too deadly greedy world,
Martin

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... Defending against a fan blade into the fuselage is about the same as defending against a surface to air missile shrapnel into the fuselage. How often does it happen, how much additional weight for redundancy, how much operational cost, how much global warming, etc.

That is actually done.

Again: Why not so for the Boeing 737?... (And other Boeings?...)


All in our deadly greedy world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
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