Absolutely. And why isn't runway 24 used?

The airport layout suggests that runway 06 allows for minimum taxiing to the terminal buildings.

Hence, all to avoid the few miles and the small extra of engine time?


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Absolutely. And why isn't runway 24 used?

Because non-pilots are making the decision, "noise sensitive area" comes up first, NIMBY number two, ... .

Personally I think all NIMBY excuses should be ignored. Like Heathrow most of these airports were built on virtually uninhabited area's. The housing and businesses have been built just because they are close to the airport.
The office my youngest works out of, is there, just because it is close to Gatwick.

Absolutely. And why isn't runway 24 used?

The airport layout suggests that runway 06 allows for minimum taxiing to the terminal buildings.

Hence, all to avoid the few miles and the small extra of engine time?

Not so small. If you actually watched the video, you must request runway 24 at least 30 minutes before landing. It takes a while to turn an airport around, so you will be in a holding pattern for half an hour. Then add the taxi on top. Wouldn't surprise me to find out that the fuel burn for the hold is more than the profit on the flight.

Airlines that don't have Safety First should have their operating certificates revoked.

Now if aircraft manufactures can't assume some level of competence in the flight crew, and this is what ends up in the cockpit, why do you want to blame the aircraft manufacturer? After all the METAR for the airport is transmitted digitally and the selection of the approach and runway are input to the FMS and it knows the weight of the aircraft so it can automatically calculate a landing distance and reject a landing attempt if there isn't enough runway. Next I'll hear you require this on the MAX before it can fly again.

... Now if aircraft manufactures can't assume some level of competence in the flight crew...

We've already covered at length for how Boeing appears to have used completely unreasonable 'pilot must respond correctly within 3 seconds of all and any anomaly and regardless of a cockpit cacophony of confusion' design excuses criteria which has killed people and presently has the Boeing 737 Max grounded for over a year. Also, there appears to be further Boeing greedy stupidity that looks to be leading to an overhaul of parts of the certification game...


Agreed that this runway overrun looks to be independent of whatever aircraft was being flown.

Unless that is Boeing (Marketing?) suggests (Markets) and accepts lower pilot standards?

Who knows?

All just my most humble ignorant opinion as always...


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Martin

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We've already covered at length for how Boeing appears to have used completely unreasonable 'pilot must respond correctly within 3 seconds of all and any anomaly

At cruise speed in three seconds the plane covers 1/2 mile. I don't think 3 seconds is all that unreasonable a time frame for a pilot to respond. Or, do you think the plane should cover 5 miles before he responds, 30 seconds?
Now in a Cessna 150 a somewhat longer time might be okay for some things, but let me ask have you ever done stall training in one? Ever had a stall where you had some yaw? How rapidly did you enter the spin? That is more the time period a pilot needs to respond. Proficiency! There is only one way to get that, training, and only one way to keep it, frequent use.

Another video from Blancolirio
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XReQNKbIkdw&feature=em-uploademail

It sounds to me that this pilot should have gone around a few minutes before the actual touchdown, but for reasons unknown he carried on it, when he plenty of time to get out of the situation.

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We've already covered at length for how Boeing appears to have used completely unreasonable 'pilot must respond correctly within 3 seconds of all and any anomaly

At cruise speed in three seconds the plane covers 1/2 mile. I don't think 3 seconds is all that unreasonable a time frame for a pilot to respond...

Flying the plane is not an anomaly.

Having every alarm in the cockpit go off is very much an anomaly.

So, really, can anyone unravel what is going on in less than three seconds in a Boeing cockpit with all alarms screaming?


There is a very good reason why we have two pilots in commercial aircraft. One pilot keeps the plane flying whilst the second pilot works through a faults list for any problem.

The Boeing problems under discussion have been catastrophic by design before a pilot could even get through the check list. Oh, also the particular fault scenario was kept a secret twice over... Oh also further, the very same type of single-point-of-catastrophic failure appears to have been buried and covered up from a 2009 Amsterdam crash...


All normal business for Boeing?

All just my ignorant humble opinion of what I see from the real world facts,

All in our very greedy world,
Martin

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We've already covered at length for how Boeing appears to have used completely unreasonable 'pilot must respond correctly within 3 seconds of all and any anomaly

At cruise speed in three seconds the plane covers 1/2 mile. I don't think 3 seconds is all that unreasonable a time frame for a pilot to respond...

Flying the plane is not an anomaly.

Having every alarm in the cockpit go off is very much an anomaly.

Having every alarm go off should be expected. Bad input data is one, electric shorts, parts coming off, we could go on, but it isn't an unexpected or unprecedented event.

With everything blaring or nothing blaring, having to haul back (or shove forward) on the yoke tells the pilot he has a runaway trim. At least it tells a pilot who has been trained to fly and not one who has been trained to read checklists.

Fly the plane first. It does help to know how to fly and not just enter data onto computer screens and read checklists.

Fly first. Do your memorized check lists. Once back under reasonable control work the written checklists. Fly first!

If you aren't under control you aren't flying. Fly First!

Unfortunately there are two kinds of commercial pilots. One it is a job just looking for a paycheck. Two loves flying, paycheck is a bonus. Which one do you want as PIC?

Personally I think every ATP should have spent some time in a Schweitzer and a Citabria just to round out their pilot skill-set.

I did a 5 hour 26 minute, eighty mile round trip in an I26, up in MI in July 1980. Does that count.

I did a 5 hour 26 minute, eighty mile round trip in an 1-26, up in MI in July 1980. Does that count.

That sounds like a pile of fun!

More Boeing software problems.
SpaceNews - Starliner investigation finds numerous problems in Boeing software development process

WASHINGTON — Boeing will reverify all the software on its CST-100 Starliner commercial crew spacecraft after an ongoing investigation found “numerous” problems in the original development process that allowed at least two major problems to escape detection.

In a call with reporters Feb. 7, NASA and Boeing officials said they had made no decisions about whether a second uncrewed test flight, or Orbital Flight Test (OFT) of the spacecraft will be needed, but that there were significant issues with the spacecraft, in particular how its software was developed, that need to be corrected.

“We do think that the OFT flight had a lot of anomalies,” said NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine during the call.

Of particular concern is the software on Starliner. One issue, found immediately after separating from its upper stage, was a timer offset that prevented the spacecraft from firing its thrusters as planned to reach orbit. While the spacecraft was able to reach orbit, it consumed more fuel than planned, ruling out a planned International Space Station docking and ending the mission just two days after launch.

John Mulholland, vice president and program manager for the Starliner program at Boeing, said the Starliner software is intended to initialize its mission elapsed timer from the Atlas 5 launch vehicle, but only in the “terminal count” phase of the countdown. The software, he said, lacked that terminal count requirement. “So, it polled an incorrect mission elapsed time from the launch vehicle, which then gave us an 11-hour mismatch,” he said.

The second problem, revealed Feb. 6 at a meeting of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), was a “valve mapping error” for the thrusters in the vehicle’s service module. Those thrusters perform a “disposal burn” of the service module after separating from the crew module just before reentry.

Mulholland said the valves were configured for conditions in normal flight for that disposal burn, which, had it not been corrected, could have pushed the service module into the crew module. That could have caused the crew capsule to become unstable, requiring additional thruster firings to reorient itself, or have damaged the capsule’s heat shield.

More Boeing software problems.
SpaceNews - Starliner investigation finds numerous problems in Boeing software development process

WASHINGTON — Boeing will reverify all the software on its CST-100 Starliner commercial crew spacecraft after an ongoing investigation found “numerous” problems in the original development process that allowed at least two major problems to escape detection...

Thanks for that. Looks rather scary!...


There's further dire comment in:

Starliner snafu could've been worse: Software errors plague Boeing's Calamity Capsule
wrote:

NASA: Defects risked 'loss of vehicle'

... after it was revealed that December's anomaly could have been a lot, lot worse...

... It was unclear if NASA would insist Boeing repeat the flight. The mutterings from the duo seemed to indicate that maybe, just maybe, the capsule had done enough to prove it was safe. However, a clue that all may have not been well could be seen in between the hand-wringing over the 737 MAX in Boeing's last set of financials (PDF). In the documents, the company recorded a charge to provision for an additional uncrewed mission if needed...

... Firstly, that timer wasn't the only software glitch. The Service Module (SM) Disposal Sequence was incorrectly translated into the SM Integrated Propulsion Controller (IPC). The result was that rather than performing a burn to dispose of the SM prior to re-entry, the bug could have actually sent the SM bouncing off the Crew Module. Fortunately, the team noticed that second error while reviewing the code following the first, and uploaded the fix prior to landing.

The third issue concerned the space-to-ground link "which impeded the Flight Control team's ability to command and control the vehicle"...

... The agency went on to note: "Ground intervention prevented loss of vehicle in both cases."

Bugs in complex software have always been expected. However, NASA gave the blade a twist by pointing out that "there were numerous instances where the Boeing software quality processes either should have or could have uncovered the defects."...

... After the horrors revealed ... we'll be watching through our fingers to see what is lurking in Boeing's workplace culture that resulted in "breakdowns in the test and verification phase failed to identify the defects preflight despite their detectability".

To my ignorant view, that all looks like flying on rushed prayers flying new software patches whilst in flight! Horrors indeed!!

See "Re: "re-verifying flight software code"" for further apt comment...


Scary stuff! And Boeing are expecting to fly people?

All from our only one greedy world,
Martin

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Meanwhile for the continuing deadly saga of the Boeing 737 Max:

What Needs to Happen to Get Boeing’s 737 Max Flying Again?
wrote:

... The plane has been grounded since last March, after two crashes in five months killed 346 people. The crisis has cost Boeing billions of dollars ...

Now there are signs that the Max may return to service relatively soon...

... The indicator light is just one of several issues that Boeing is still trying to resolve. Another major sticking point is whether Boeing needs to separate wire bundles that could, in rare circumstances, cause a short circuit and possibly lead to a catastrophic failure.

Boeing is evaluating the issue and publicly says it will turn its analysis over to the F.A.A. and allow the regulator to make a decision. Privately, the company is making the case that the bundles do not need to be separated, according to two people familiar with the matter. Some F.A.A. officials and European regulators, however, made it clear to Boeing that it must have a persuasive argument for not separating the wires...

... Boeing is also still working with Collins Aerospace, one of its major subcontractors, to fix lingering issues with updates to the computers that control MCAS, the software that contributed to both crashes. Changes to the software have introduced new complications, such as the issue with the indicator light. Another irregularity, related to the software that monitors the plane as it powers up, is also being worked through...

... After the certification flights, international regulators will convene for several days to determine final training requirements for the Max...

... Once the Max is approved, airlines face the task of persuading people to get on it...

Worryingly, there is still the big pressure there for Boeing to 'cut corners':

Boeing's got bigger problems than the 737 Max
wrote:

... The 737 Max crisis has stymied Boeing's growth. But Boeing (BA) faces a longer-term threat that is even more important to overcome: Boeing is falling behind rival Airbus and needs to build the next generation of planes to remain competitive in the future...

... But Boeing already has fallen behind Airbus. The market for a mid-range aircraft is probably somewhere been 2,500 and 4,000 planes. Airbus has already taken orders for the A321neo-XLR to serve that market. But once airlines pick a plane in a segment of the market, they rarely buy a rival's plane in the same segment...

... The first 737 was delivered more than 50 years ago in 1967. The Max is just the latest version, as it debuted in 2016. Even without the current crisis, experts say it was a model that needed a complete redesign. "The 737 has reached the end of its line with the Max," said Aboulafia. "It made sense as a last of its kind. There's no way you can get a fifth version out of the plane."

Needless to say for myself, this is one I'll be safely watching from the ground up...

All in our only one greedy world,
Martin

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MAX Concerns Launch DOT Audit Of FAA Pilot Training Requirements

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Office of Inspector General announced on Monday that it has initiated an audit of the FAA’s pilot training requirements due to concerns raised by the fatal crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March 2019, both Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The audit will review “domestic and international pilot training standards related to commercial passenger aircraft, including the use of automation.” It was requested by the Chairmen and the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation.

“These fatal accidents have drawn widespread attention to FAA’s oversight and certification practices, including the Agency’s process for establishing pilot training requirements for the aircraft,” Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits Matthew Hampton said in a memo (PDF). “According to the Lion Air accident report, the pilots’ responses to erroneous activations of MCAS contributed to the crash, raising international concerns about the role of pilot training.”

According to the Inspector General’s office, the objectives of the audit are to evaluate the FAA’s process for establishing pilot training requirements for air carriers operating U.S.-certificated passenger aircraft and to review international requirements “for air carrier pilot training regarding the use of flight deck automation.” The audit is expected to begin later this month.

MAX Concerns Launch DOT Audit Of FAA Pilot Training Requirements

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Office of Inspector General announced on Monday that it has initiated an audit of the FAA’s pilot training requirements due to concerns raised by the fatal crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March 2019, both Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The audit will review “domestic and international pilot training standards related to commercial passenger aircraft, including the use of automation.” It was requested by the Chairmen and the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation.

“These fatal accidents have drawn widespread attention to FAA’s oversight and certification practices, including the Agency’s process for establishing pilot training requirements for the aircraft,” Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits Matthew Hampton said in a memo (PDF). “According to the Lion Air accident report, the pilots’ responses to erroneous activations of MCAS contributed to the crash, raising international concerns about the role of pilot training.”

According to the Inspector General’s office, the objectives of the audit are to evaluate the FAA’s process for establishing pilot training requirements for air carriers operating U.S.-certificated passenger aircraft and to review international requirements “for air carrier pilot training regarding the use of flight deck automation.” The audit is expected to begin later this month.

I hope that includes reassessing the cockpit user interfaces and the pilot-cockpit interactions...

I believe a big part of the two Boeing Max crashes was the total confusion presented to the pilots. Additionally, those pilots were totally untrained and unaware for the unique consequences of the failure of the (singular) AoA sensors on the Boeing 737 Max ...


All in our only one rushed greedy world,
Martin

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those pilots were totally untrained

Were they not trained to the standards that Boeing had set for the Max.

i.e. Being a 737 pilot that had studied the half hour tablet training session.

those pilots were totally untrained

Were they not trained to the standards that Boeing had set for the Max.

i.e. Being a 737 pilot that had studied the half hour tablet training session.

That assumes they were trained to 737 standards before they look at the tablet for MAX familiarization. I think that is what the DOT investigation is to look at. Are US and foreign pilots trained enough period.

There absolutely seem to be differences. Many US Aircrews had AOA / MCAS events but none resulted in air-frame loss.

Speculating that is because most US crews spend many hours in Part 135 operations before they do Part 121 operations. Part 135 operators are notorious for not so well kept aircraft, so the crew gets tossed several actual in-flight emergencies while they build their hours for their ATP. Foreign seem to go directly from PPL to ATP so the only "emergency" they have had is in a sim where in the back of your mind you know you are going home to sleep in your bed. Real, you are worried you are going to meet your maker perhaps in "178 seconds."

... Many US Aircrews had AOA / MCAS events but none resulted in air-frame loss...

Really?!

Please give further details??

And especially why no follow-up action was taken?!!!


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Martin

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... Many US Aircrews had AOA / MCAS events but none resulted in air-frame loss...

Really?!

Please give further details??

Go back many many pages in the thread and find the posts from several persons pointing to the ASRS reports, or search the ASRS database yourself.

Go back many many pages in the thread and find the posts from several persons pointing to the ASRS reports, or search the ASRS database yourself.

Please enlighten us with a few (five?) examples?

Again, if so, why were these incidents not followed up to save hundreds of lives?


All in our only one deadly greedy world,
Martin

---

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