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Profits 1st, Safety 2nd? Pt 2
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moomin Send message Joined: 21 Oct 17 Posts: 6204 Credit: 38,420 RAC: 0 |
Hmm... That both airline companies and manufacturing companies go hand in hand so to speak is perhaps not unusually when it comes to costs. But what has this to do with the Boeing MCAS? But Ethiopian Airlines is the largest airline company in Africa. Ethiopia is also a country with lots of corruption. Actually country no 114 on the Transparency International Index https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 Perhaps there could be a problem there... |
Gary Charpentier Send message Joined: 25 Dec 00 Posts: 31012 Credit: 53,134,872 RAC: 32 |
But what has this to do with the Boeing MCAS?Maybe records that needed to be faked that showed a repair was made when it wasn't? I don't know but a black box showing failed part -- one that is required to be working to fly -- from engine start to crash is pretty damning. Someone wanted pretty bad to paper their butt over. Ethiopia is also a country with lots of corruption. Actually country no 114 on the Transparency International Index https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018Ya think? |
Sirius B Send message Joined: 26 Dec 00 Posts: 24912 Credit: 3,081,182 RAC: 7 |
Everyone is to blame but Boeing! |
moomin Send message Joined: 21 Oct 17 Posts: 6204 Credit: 38,420 RAC: 0 |
I hope everyone understand that a system like MCAS rely on not only the software but also the hardware that support the system. AND the pilots that are part of the system. The 737 MAX is not a fly-by-wire plane. Boeing seems to not acknowledge that. Or should I say they do but when accidents like what happened to 737 MAX they act like ostriches. |
W-K 666 Send message Joined: 18 May 99 Posts: 19401 Credit: 40,757,560 RAC: 67 |
Boeing 737 MAX timetable uncertain as regulators continue safety review WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. and European Union regulators said on Tuesday they were still reviewing changes Boeing Co (BA.N) made to 737 MAX software after two fatal crashes, a development that raised questions about how quickly the grounded aircraft can return to service. The ongoing safety review means a key 737 MAX certification test flight is unlikely before November, two sources said. FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told Reuters in September the agency would need about a month following the yet-to-be scheduled certification test flight before the planes could return to service. FAA still needs to see Boeing’s “final system description†- a “500-ish page document that has the architecture of the flight control system and the changes that they have made,†Dickson said last month. It then will need to complete an “integrated system safety analysis†and conduct pilot workload management scenarios. |
W-K 666 Send message Joined: 18 May 99 Posts: 19401 Credit: 40,757,560 RAC: 67 |
Business Insider - A damning new report into the Boeing 737 Max slammed the FAA's 'inadequate awareness' of the system blamed for 2 deadly crashes or Reuters - FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet's anti-stall system: JATR findings A new report into the Federal Aviation Administration's oversight of the certification of the Boeing 737 Max has slammed its "inadequate awareness" of the system blamed for two deadly crashes involving the plane. Also on Reuters, United Airlines cancels Boeing 737 MAX flights until January 6 |
ML1 Send message Joined: 25 Nov 01 Posts: 21229 Credit: 7,508,002 RAC: 20 |
More of the fatal Boeing 737 Max story unfolds: Boeing 737 Max: European regulators insist on more testing of troubled plane European air safety regulators have told their US counterpart they want more testing on fixes to the troubled 737 Max flight-control systems before the plane is cleared to re-enter service... ... The aim, according to the Journal, is to add redundancy by having both computers work simultaneously to eliminate potential problems stemming from computer chip malfunctions... ‘Startle factor’ a key concern in study of grounded 737 MAX fleets: Transport Canada Global regulators are looking at “startle factors†that can overwhelm pilots as they consider revised protocols for the Boeing 737 MAX... In scathing lawsuit, Southwest pilots’ union says Boeing 737 MAX was unsafe ... In a scathing indictment of Boeing, the suit directly attacks the manufacturer’s integrity. It accuses Boeing of deliberately putting profits ahead of safety considerations... Southwest Pilots Sue, Allege Boeing Made ‘Calculated Decision’ in Faulty 737 Max Design ... “Boeing made a calculated decision to rush a re-engined aircraft to market to secure its single-aisle market share and prioritize its bottom line,â€â€™ the lawsuit reads. “In doing so, Boeing abandoned sound design and engineering practices, withheld critical safety information from regulators and deliberately mislead (sic) its customers, pilots and the public about the true scope of design changes to the 737 MAX.â€... So... How did the Boeing 737 MAX come to so badly fatally fly?... Personally, none of that deadly silliness flies for me. All in our only one world, Martin See new freedom: Mageia Linux Take a look for yourself: Linux Format The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3) |
W-K 666 Send message Joined: 18 May 99 Posts: 19401 Credit: 40,757,560 RAC: 67 |
Boeing names new board chairman in setback to CEO October 12, 2019 ** https://setiathome.berkeley.edu/forum_thread.php?id=78677&postid=2015219#2015219 |
ML1 Send message Joined: 25 Nov 01 Posts: 21229 Credit: 7,508,002 RAC: 20 |
More of the fatal Boeing 737 Max story unfolds: From my personally ignorant unknowingness of anything:
See new freedom: Mageia Linux Take a look for yourself: Linux Format The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3) |
ML1 Send message Joined: 25 Nov 01 Posts: 21229 Credit: 7,508,002 RAC: 20 |
More of the Boeing story unfolds. To my humble personal view, ever more damningly so: 737 Max lawsuit suggests parallels to 1990s crashes A lawsuit filed by the former inspector general of the Department of Transportation accuses Boeing in a new lawsuit of repeatedly concealing design flaws in its aircraft and blaming pilots in the aftermath of crashes... ... draws parallels between Boeing's responses in the aftermath of the 737 Max crashes in October and March and two crashes involving older 737 models in 1991 and 1994. After both series of accidents, Boeing withheld information, rejected or resisted calls to ground the aircraft and emphasized pilots' faults over design issues, the lawsuit argues. "Boeing deployed a common and continuous scheme after both series of crashes to conceal deadly faults in the aircraft that caused the planes, without pilot input or ability to overcome the aircraft, to dive into the ground killing all aboard," the lawsuit states... Boeing pushed FAA to relax 737 MAX certification requirements for crew alerts In 2014, Boeing convinced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to relax the safety standards for the new 737 MAX related to cockpit alerts that would warn pilots if something went wrong during flight, according to documents reviewed by the Seattle Times. Seeking an exception, Boeing relied on a special FAA rule to successfully argue that full compliance with the latest federal requirements would be “impractical†for the MAX and would cost too much... ... Based on lessons learned from past airline accidents, the FAA regulation stipulates precise design details for the warning displays in the cockpit. These are aimed at ensuring that alerts relay clearly to the pilots what’s going on when a malfunction occurs, catch attention so that they won’t be overlooked, and avert any possible confusion. During the two fatal MAX crashes that killed 346 people, pilots struggled to understand the cascade of warnings in their cockpits. Last week a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on those crashes highlighted the crucial role that crew alerting systems play... International Regulator Report Slams Boeing, FAA Over 737 Max Design and Approval ... More broadly, the panel also questioned how systems on the the MAX were certified as derivative of a now-50-year-old aircraft design. And it further recommended that airplane-safety systems address the new reality of increased cockpit automation by reducing the reliance on pilots to respond to emergencies, and instead designing protections as part of the systems. The report from officials representing 10 different regulatory bodies carries the weight of the world’s aviation experts. Its findings point to glaring shortcomings in how Boeing’s 737 MAX was certified as safe, with the company effectively auditing its own design and and the FAA unable to fulfill its oversight role... Boeing, FAA both faulted in certification of the 737 Max A panel of international aviation regulators found that Boeing withheld key information about the 737 Max from pilots and regulators, and the Federal Aviation Administration lacked the expertise to understand an automated flight system... ... the panel made 12 recommendations for improving the FAA’s certification of new aircraft, including more emphasis on understanding how pilots will handle the increasing amount of automation driving modern planes... ... “As pilots, we have to be able to trust that Boeing will provide all the information we need to safely operate our aircraft,†Weaks said. “In the case of the 737 Max, that absolutely did not happen.â€... Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system ... Certifying a new flight control system Going against a long Boeing tradition of giving the pilot complete control of the aircraft, the MAX’s new MCAS automatic flight control system was designed to act in the background, without pilot input... Boeing rejected 737 MAX safety upgrades before fatal crashes, whistleblower says ... describes how around 2014 his group presented to managers and senior executives a proposal to add various safety upgrades to the MAX. The complaint, a copy of which was reviewed by The Seattle Times, suggests that one of the proposed systems could have potentially prevented the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that killed 346 people. Three of Ewbank’s former colleagues interviewed for this story concurred. The details revealed in the ethics complaint raise new questions about the culture at Boeing and whether the long-held imperative that safety must be the overarching priority was compromised on the MAX by business considerations and management’s focus on schedule and cost. Managers twice rejected adding the new system on the basis of “cost and potential (pilot) training impact,â€... In summary, I ain't flying anything Boeing for a year or two after all the fixes and news have all healthily stabilized... All in our only one world, Martin See new freedom: Mageia Linux Take a look for yourself: Linux Format The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3) |
W-K 666 Send message Joined: 18 May 99 Posts: 19401 Credit: 40,757,560 RAC: 67 |
Breaking news. WaPO Text messages show Boeing employees knew in 2016 of problems that turned deadly on the 737 Max Oct. 18, 2019 at 6:45 p.m. GMT+1 National Review Boeing Pilot Lied to F.A.A. Regarding 737 Max Jet A Boeing pilot who tested the 737 Max jet in flight simulators in 2016 admitted in a series of text messages that he lied to the Federal Aviation Administration regarding the plane’s performance. |
W-K 666 Send message Joined: 18 May 99 Posts: 19401 Credit: 40,757,560 RAC: 67 |
Lion Air families told 737 MAX design flaws linked to deadly crash JAKARTA (Reuters) - Mechanical and design issues contributed to the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX jet last October, Indonesian investigators told victims’ families in a briefing on Wednesday ahead of the release of a final report. Or at the BBC https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-50151573 |
ML1 Send message Joined: 25 Nov 01 Posts: 21229 Credit: 7,508,002 RAC: 20 |
Lion Air families told 737 MAX design flaws linked to deadly crash Thanks for that. As a reminder as to what happened: What went wrong inside Boeing's cockpit? Note that for that BBC news report noting the crash report release, there is the positive spin in the title of "Boeing expects 737 Max to fly again by New Year" To my mind, that headline suggests a woeful shift of emphasis as though the crash victims and the required redesign are indeed nothing more than just an irritating business expense... Also specially note the passages: ... The notion that assumptions made by Boeing and the regulators who signed the aircraft off about how that system would perform and how pilots would react to it were "incorrect" suggests something went badly wrong... ... The fundamental question belying everything is: why was more drastic action not taken after the Lion Air crash before a second accident killed another 157 people and grounded the plane worldwide?... All in our only one world, Martin See new freedom: Mageia Linux Take a look for yourself: Linux Format The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3) |
ML1 Send message Joined: 25 Nov 01 Posts: 21229 Credit: 7,508,002 RAC: 20 |
How MCAS came to be? A certain well known pilot has given direct good comment against some of the Boeing 'excuses': Captain Sully Labels Boeing 737 MAX’s MCAS “Fatally Flawed Design†... Captain Chesley ‘Sully’ Sullenberger has written a letter to the editor of New York Times Magazine regarding the ‘What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?’ feature... ... In his letter he explains his personal experience of the Boeing 737 MAX MCAS software in a flight simulator. “I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design.†says Sully... ... Captain Sully’s response perfectly sums up why Langewiesche’s claims are disingenuous. “Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap,†says Captain Sully. Lion Air’s safety record is pretty terrible as far as airlines go. But, the fact that Lion Air Flight 610 crashed as a result of the same software flaw as Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, shows the MCAS software was clearly not fit for purpose. All in our only one world... Martin See new freedom: Mageia Linux Take a look for yourself: Linux Format The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3) |
ML1 Send message Joined: 25 Nov 01 Posts: 21229 Credit: 7,508,002 RAC: 20 |
This makes for a very hefty read: Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System - faa.gov Observations, Findings, and Recommendations Submitted to the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration October 11, 2019 (pdf) For ease of reading, I would suggest to skip the preambles and jump straight into the various Observations, Findings, and Recommendations. The list is to my mind damningly long and simply damning. My own personal reading is that Boeing gamed and gambled the system to greedily hustle in their profits. All other considerations be damned? (Note: That report is not the yet-to-be-released Accident Investigation Report for the Lion Air crash.) All in our only one world, Martin See new freedom: Mageia Linux Take a look for yourself: Linux Format The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3) |
ML1 Send message Joined: 25 Nov 01 Posts: 21229 Credit: 7,508,002 RAC: 20 |
This makes for a very hefty read: The New York Times summary of the report is: Boeing and F.A.A. Faulted in Damning Report on 737 Max Certification A breakdown in the nation’s regulatory system and poor communication from Boeing compromised the safety of the 737 Max jet before it crashed twice in five months and killed 346 people, according to a damning report released Friday. Boeing did not adequately explain to federal regulators how a crucial new system on the plane worked, the report says... The Federal Aviation Administration relied heavily on Boeing employees to vouch for the safety of the Max and lacked the ability to effectively analyze much of what Boeing did share about the new plane... Boeing employees who worked on behalf of the F.A.A. faced “undue pressures†at times during the plane’s development because of “conflicting priorities,†according to the report. “This report confirms our very worst fears about a broken system,†Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut, said in an interview... All in our only one world, Martin See new freedom: Mageia Linux Take a look for yourself: Linux Format The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3) |
rob smith Send message Joined: 7 Mar 03 Posts: 22534 Credit: 416,307,556 RAC: 380 |
This bit really concerns me - it points both at Boeing and the FAA for not ensuring the independence of the FAA's scrutiny of Boeing's work: Boeing employees who worked on behalf of the F.A.A. faced “undue pressures†at times during the plane’s development because of “conflicting priorities,†according to the report. In my book, being employed by Boeing and working on Boeing projects for the FAA is a serious breach of the principal of the FAA (staff) being independent of the "client organisation". Bob Smith Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society) Somewhere in the (un)known Universe? |
Sirius B Send message Joined: 26 Dec 00 Posts: 24912 Credit: 3,081,182 RAC: 7 |
In my book, being employed by Boeing and working on Boeing projects for the FAA is a serious breach of the principal of the FAA (staff) being independent of the "client organisation".In plain language, a conflict of interests. A series of failures led to the Lion Air tragedy. "If one of the nine hadn't occurred, maybe the accident wouldn't have occurred." |
Gary Charpentier Send message Joined: 25 Dec 00 Posts: 31012 Credit: 53,134,872 RAC: 32 |
One thought BBC reported news. Now it seems they write opinion and call it news. Most damning statement is "The 353-page report found the jet should have been grounded before departing on the fatal flight because of an earlier cockpit issue." No way to gloss this over. And it isn't a "Maybe" this is a for sure no crash. There is "Further, a crucial sensor - which had been bought from a repair shop in Florida - had not been properly tested, the report found. On Friday, the US aviation regulator revoked the company's certification." The very reason the plane should have been on the ground, the "crucial sensor" was not working. It is on the list of things that must be working to fly the airplane. |
Sirius B Send message Joined: 26 Dec 00 Posts: 24912 Credit: 3,081,182 RAC: 7 |
I see you still believe that everyone but Boeing is to blame. Didn't MCAS only operate from JUST the one sensor? Design flaw. Did the repair shop design it? Did the airline design it? Did the pilots design it? Did maintenance design it? Did the passengers design it? Did the FAA design it? DIDN'T BOEING design it? |
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