Boeing planned to wait three years to fix a non-working safety alert on its 737 Max aircraft and sped up the process only after the first of two deadly crashes involving the planes.
The company acknowledged that it originally planned to fix a cockpit warning light in 2020 after two key lawmakers disclosed the company's timetable on Friday.

Oops

Oops again

In late May Canadian regulators suggested they may look to work more closely with European regulators, rather than the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), on the issue of the 737 Max's safety.

They only have themselves to blame.

Yes our Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System on our web browsers to your first link "Oops" doesn't work:)

The requested URL was rejected. Please consult with your administrator.
Your support ID is: 17677427049153606480

Who's my administrator?
Who's to blame?

[url=https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/boeing-wanted-to-wait-3-years-to-fix-safety-alert-on-737-max-1.4456477]quote]Oops[/url]

doesn't work.

https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/boeing-wanted-to-wait-3-years-to-fix-safety-alert-on-737-max-1.4456477

Richard beat me to it by 15 secs. :-)

LOL:) the first URL ended with a "]"
It's quite easy to make mistakes when "coding". Been there, done that. And Boeing as well apparently...
Aka. Sh*t happens...

Well the Indonesian prelim report blows Garry's theory about "airline not revealing maintenance logs" clear out of the water because there they are. Interesting that on Oct 27 one of the AoA was replaced, and no mention of the control box.

The Ethiopian aircraft had a "visual" inspection lasting a few days just about a month before the crash, and no other relevant maintenance intervention thereafter.

Since the immediate flight prior to March 10 crash reported an issue per news reports* and nothing was done to fix it ...

*those ones about an extra pilot in a jump seat having to help ...

Since the immediate flight prior to March 10 crash reported an issue per news reports* and nothing was done to fix it ...
*those ones about an extra pilot in a jump seat having to help ...

Let's say you're correct in that it was "slack maintenance". That slack maintenance exposed a serious flaw in Boeing's flight systems.
Who's to say that had that flaw not existed, the pilots could have recovered - In fact, who's to say that the disasters would have occurred.

Since the immediate flight prior to March 10 crash reported an issue per news reports* and nothing was done to fix it ...
*those ones about an extra pilot in a jump seat having to help ...

Let's say you're correct in that it was "slack maintenance". That slack maintenance exposed a serious flaw in Boeing's flight systems.
Who's to say that had that flaw not existed, the pilots could have recovered - In fact, who's to say that the disasters would have occurred.

Now you are following the chain of events and if you keep doing so will expose every weak link so that safety can be improved. If you focus on one item, you miss every other lesson you could have learned and all those you missed will bring another plane down someday.

Now you are following the chain of events and if you keep doing so will expose every weak link so that safety can be improved. If you focus on one item, you miss every other lesson you could have learned and all those you missed will bring another plane down someday.

Exactly. Practically most air disasters have occurred to a culmination of several errors.
The problem on this thread is that in numerous posts you've done your best to absolve Boeing.
As pointed out in the Transport thread in the Café, the 3 main culprits are:
Boeing
FAA
Airlines
Unless the FAA gets its act together, Boeing will end up facing costs of certification per country, as the Aviation Authorities of the RotW no longer trust either Boeing or the FAA. TBH, can you blame them for that, I don't.

Now you are following the chain of events and if you keep doing so will expose every weak link so that safety can be improved. If you focus on one item, you miss every other lesson you could have learned and all those you missed will bring another plane down someday.

Exactly. Practically most air disasters have occurred to a culmination of several errors.
The problem on this thread is that in numerous posts you've done your best to absolve Boeing.

not at all. just every other poster refuses to understand there is a chain and only wants to blame MCAS for Ethiopian crash. Lionair is a different story. Also seems to me like several things in addition to MCAS on the plane have a percent of fault, AoA sensors - not made by Boeing - having a good measure.

As pointed out in the Transport thread in the Café, the 3 main culprits are:
Boeing
FAA
Airlines

Perhaps in different order for the two crashes.

Unless the FAA gets its act together, Boeing will end up facing costs of certification per country, as the Aviation Authorities of the RotW no longer trust either Boeing or the FAA. TBH, can you blame them for that, I don't.

Ask Ronald Reagan about the FAA.
Ask Wall Street about Boeing after it went on its M&A binge.
As to the Airlines, again ask Wall Street or whatever king or government owns them.

Boeing and the Airlines are in the business of building and flying Ford Pintos. Every penny spent on safety has to be balanced by a guess on how much it will save in lawsuits. That is the fiduciary duty to the shareholder to maximize profit. Only via tort or regulation do they have any duty to the flying public or the people who are under their planes. Understand the very people you think they have a duty to, they do not. Aren't legal ethics grand?!

As a reminder for the confusion from the actions of MCAS ("AND trim") amidst other faults, with MCAS adding an extra unknown to kill everyone on board:


From : PRELIMINARY Aircraft Accident Investigation Report - Lion Mentari Airlines Boeing 737-8 (MAX)

SYNOPSIS

... The engineer performed flushing the left Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) and static ADM to rectify the IAS and ALT disagree followed by operation test on ground and [all was] found satisfied [satisfactory]. The Feel Differential Pressure was rectified by performed cleaned electrical connector plug of elevator feel computer. The test on ground found the problem had been solved.

At 2320 UTC, (0620 on 29 October 2018LT), the aircraft departed from Jakarta with intended destination of Pangkal Pinang. The DFDR recorded a difference between [the] left and right AoA of about 20° and continued until the end of recording. During rotation the left control column stick shaker activated and continued for most of the flight. During the flight the [Second In Command] SIC asked the controller to confirm the altitude of the aircraft and later also asked the speed as shown on the controller radar display. The SIC reported experienc[ing] „flight control problem‟. After the flaps retracted, the DFDR recorded automatic AND trim active followed by flight crew commanded ANU trim. The automatic AND trim stopped when the flaps extended. When the flaps retracted to 0, the automatic AND trim and flight crew commanded ANU trim began again and continued for the remainder of the flight. At 23:31:54 UTC, the DFDR stopped recording...

... According to the weight and balance sheet, on board the aircraft were two pilots, five flight attendants and 181 passengers consisted of 178 adult, one child and two infants.
The voyage report showed that the number of flight attendant on board was six flight attendants...

That was for the Lion Air disaster for some fatally impossibly difficult flying, all at low altitude, immediately upon takeoff...

All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
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As a reminder for the confusion from the actions of MCAS ("AND trim") amidst other faults, with MCAS adding an extra unknown to kill everyone on board:

And from : Aircraft Accident Investigation Preliminary Report - Ethiopian Airlines Group B737-8 (MAX)

... There were 157 passengers and crew on board. All were fatally injured, and the Aircraft was destroyed...

... At 05:41:30, the Captain requested the First-Officer to pitch up with him and the First-Officer acknowledged.

At 05:41:32, the left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording.

At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.

At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working...

... At 05:43:04, the Captain asked the First Officer to pitch up together and said that pitch is not enough.

At 05:43:11, about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13, 4002ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the [Aircraft Nose Up] ANU direction. The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.

At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an [Aircraft Nose Down] AND [MCAS] automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds.

The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40° nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording. The left Indicated Airspeed increased, eventually reaching approximately 458 kts and the right Indicated Airspeed reached 500 kts at the end of the recording. The last recorded pressure altitude was 5,419 ft on the left and 8,399 ft on the right.

The aircraft is completely destroyed...

That was for the Ethiopia Air disaster for some fatally impossibly difficult flying, all at low altitude above ground (high mountains), very soon after takeoff...

All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

... That was for the Ethiopia Air disaster for some fatally impossibly difficult flying, all at low altitude above ground (high mountains), very soon after takeoff...

My reading for the events for both disasters is that the pilots were successfully flying the aircraft, despite some of the instruments having failed and amidst a cacophony of alarms, until fatally at the last moment the MCAS added a rapid and extreme adjustment to trim the aircraft to nose-down into a nose dive. That last MCAS adjustment was too extreme for the pilots to overcome...

There may indeed be a long trail of causes. However, my reading is that it was the 'secret' MCAS that dealt the final fatal push into an unrecoverable disaster.


All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

Martin: in the Ethiopia Air case, you don't think that last down trim application had anything to do with them not following the procedure they had been trained on and turning MCAS back on? Their training very clearly said turn off, leave off. And they had turned it off but for some reason turned it back on with predictable results.

Martin: in the Ethiopia Air case, you don't think that last down trim application had anything to do with them not following the procedure they had been trained on and turning MCAS back on? Their training very clearly said turn off, leave off. And they had turned it off but for some reason turned it back on with predictable results.

Please read the report.

Then please make a good comment on what you read for the sequence of events. And how very quickly those events ran away.

Make special note about the Terrain Warning, MCAS intervening soon from take-off and hence at low altitude, and how the pilots couldn't manually move the trim adjustment wheels...


My reading is that the primary problem was a fatal (or at best an incomplete) design by Boeing...

The secret MCAS abruptly overruled the pilots' control of the aircraft...


All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

Recent news:


Boeing's software update for the Max 8 aircraft may not be enough to satisfy critics

Software updates planned for Boeing Inc.’s (BA) troubled 737 Max 8 aircraft, grounded worldwide after two deadly crashes, may not be enough to satisfy critics.

All Max 8 planes will be modified to feed additional data into a system designed for the 737 Max called MCAS, or Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, known to have been involved in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes that killed all passengers and crew on board...

... ‘This plane should never take to the air again’

Arthur Rosenberg, a plaintiffs attorney and pilot, described the dual software update as insufficient. Rosenberg has been contacted by families of crash victims considering legal representation.

“If that’s the case, this plane should never take to the air again,” he said. “You really need three AOA sensors, with two in agreement to provide data to MCAS. If you only have two, and the data is telling pilots that one doesn’t agree, you’re still left with a plane that has inherent unsafe flight conditions, which cause a nose-up tendency.”...

... MCAS was designed to make the 737 Max handle similar to earlier 737 models. Its engines, more fuel-efficient and powerful than in prior models, were raised and moved forward on the fuselage, causing it to fly with a “nose up” tendency. To compensate, Boeing installed MCAS, which automatically adjusted the nose down when data from the AOA sensor deemed it necessary...

FAA Official Echoes Boeing Timeline for Max Return This Year

... While the FAA is “under a lot of pressure,” he said the Max will be returned to service “when we believe it will be safe,” following reviews of the design, flight testing and other checks. Bahrami was reluctant to provide a timeline, but asked whether the plane would resume service this year or next, he said remarks by Boeing Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg projecting a return by the end of 2019 sounded correct...

... The FAA isn’t the only regulator that holds sway over returning the Max to the skies. The European Aviation Safety Agency also is examining Boeing’s changes, a process that won’t conclude until the end of July at the earliest, Director Patrick Ky said in a separate interview. The agency is considering whether to require additional simulator training for flying the Max, as well as potential design changes...

The very big question there is whether the Boeing 737 MAX is safely stable and flyable by the pilots for all conditions whilst MCAS is disabled...


All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

The answer to your last question is "YES".
However it doesn't handle the same as previous generation B737. And this difference is sufficient to require additional training, thus type a new type classification. And as a "new" (different) type classifiction pilots would be required to undergo proper flight training on the B737MAX in all its flight modes. The most obvious being with "full" MCAS, with "degraded" MCAS, with MCAS disabled - which is exactly what Boeing were avoiding in the original certification.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

The answer to your last question is "YES".
However it doesn't handle the same as previous generation B737. And this difference is sufficient to require additional training, thus type a new type classification. And as a "new" (different) type classifiction pilots would be required to undergo proper flight training on the B737MAX in all its flight modes. The most obvious being with "full" MCAS, with "degraded" MCAS, with MCAS disabled - which is exactly what Boeing were avoiding in the original certification.

+1

The very big question there is whether the Boeing 737 MAX is safely stable and flyable by the pilots for all conditions whilst MCAS is disabled...

The answer to your last question is "YES".
However it doesn't handle the same as previous generation B737. And this difference is sufficient to require additional training, thus type a new type classification. And as a "new" (different) type classifiction pilots would be required to undergo proper flight training on the B737MAX in all its flight modes. The most obvious being with "full" MCAS, with "degraded" MCAS, with MCAS disabled - which is exactly what Boeing were avoiding in the original certification.

That may well be the case for the original "v1" version of MCAS as envisaged that injected small and slow changes of trim.

However... And this may well be a big 'however'...

I believe the relatively benign "v1" MCAS, with deliberately limited effect, was to compensate for the 'different' thrust vector from the new bigger engines on the 737 MAX.

However: What of the reasons behind how that "v1" MCAS became the present deadly "v2" MCAS that can endstop the trim into a nose-dive beyond all hope in seconds?


To me, the need to rapidly use extravagant movement of the entire tailplane surface suggests that there are circumstances whereby pilot control of the much smaller control surfaces are ineffective... Why? How? What?

What of stall recovery for an (aerodynamically and/or weight) unbalanced airframe?...


All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

No, just Boeing's ego was in play - the airframe is dynamically stable, and flies perfectly well without MCAS, albeit at higher angles of attack than the older B737 fleets. For some reason, someone "up the tree" decided that MCAS should work "faster and thus better" in maintaining the same alpha for the B737Max and its older cousins. If allowed to the B737max would fly safely with about 5 degrees more nose up attitude than the older ones, due to the subtle changes in wing shape (almost getting to A32x family angles of attack!) It is highly probable that the older version of MCAS could still lead into the same aggressive nose down trimming, just take a few seconds longer to get there.

Most modern airliners move the whole horizontal stabiliser to achieve the correct trim, rather than just "a small tab on the back of the elevator". There are many reasons for this, not the least of which is doing so reduces the overall drag of the aircraft - a surprising amount of which comes from the tail assembly.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?