... Is this where the deadly greed of Boeing management grounds both themselves and the FAA into disrepute?...

Is this all just a deadly game of corruption??

All just a 'game' of dangerously deadly greed, where people have died, all at what cost?

To my mind, this continues to be despicably deadly damnable indeed.

One deadly thought as this debacle drags onwards:

I hope that the FAA are not politically 'pressured' or otherwise 'steamrollered' by 'business pressure' to sign off for a THIRD deadly crash...


Also note: How long does it normally take to test and certify a new aircraft design?...


All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

Boeing Max 737 jets could remain grounded into December because of friction between the manufacturer and international air safety authorities...

... the latest setback is tied to a briefing where regulators complained that Boeing failed to provide technical details and answer specific questions about modifications in the operation of Max flight control computers.

I'm feel likely that is because they now have data that their original design specs or simulations were wrong-o. Remember when the test pilots flew it (real plane not simulation) before the first plane was delivered MCAS Alpha version, failed to work as it was supposed to and allowed the plane to pitch nose up too much. So MCAS Beta version was hastily written to much more aggressively put nose down trim on the plane. Don't know if the test pilots flew that on a real airplane or just a simulator. Beta was approved and was shipped. Now it seems they are having a real problem getting MCAS to prevent too much nose up while at the same time not put in too much nose down when it shouldn't. It may well be that the base airframe design is too unstable and real flight testing is showing the problem that the simulations missed. Boeing isn't going to answer those questions until they have a good fix or come to the realization they have to scrap all the planes. Considering if they have to scrap what that does to the bottom line, any omission will be made in an attempt to forgo that possibility and get a government stamp of approval.

Oh, they learned the lesson. They are doing everything to keep the Boeing Pinto under wraps. Profit, baby, profit, make the shareholders happy, don't give them a reason to sue the company and the BoD. Oh, you meant the lesson to make a safe product. Not important, only the bottom line is important.

Making a safe plane is paramount to an aircraft manufacturer's bottom line in the long run. The quarterly profit statements discourage long run thinking. Wall street doesn't think longer than next week.

---

... Is this where the deadly greed of Boeing management grounds both themselves and the FAA into disrepute?...

Is this all just a deadly game of corruption??

All just a 'game' of dangerously deadly greed, where people have died, all at what cost?

To my mind, this continues to be despicably deadly damnable indeed.

One deadly thought as this debacle drags onwards:

I hope that the FAA are not politically 'pressured' or otherwise 'steamrollered' by 'business pressure' to sign off for a THIRD deadly crash...

This article sums up the present situation for the games at play affecting the Boeing 737 MAX:


Why the hurry to get the 737 Max back into the air?

You might have thought that two plane crashes less than five months apart would prompt serious re-examination of attitudes, assumptions, relationships and habits that may have contributed to the deaths of 346 people.

Yet recent news reports on efforts to fix flight-control technology implicated in the downing of 737 Max jets in Ethiopia last March and Indonesia last December illustrate the staying power of ingrained patterns of behavior...



To my mind, all very worrying that nothing positive has been learnt...

Also note: How long does it normally take to test and certify a new aircraft design?...

All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)

Making a safe plane is paramount to an aircraft manufacturer's bottom line in the long run. The quarterly profit statements discourage long run thinking. Wall street doesn't think longer than next week.

So correct. Why you should never do business with a public corporation.

http://www.travelvivi.com/the-most-unsafe-airplanes-in-the-world/

1. Boeing 737 JT8D
One crash per: 507 500 flying hours
Years of production: 1967-1988
Planes in operation: 517
The first version of Boeing 737 is recognized to be the most wrecking plane in the world. One air crash with a fatal outcome covers 507 500 flying hours. The less is the figure the more is the probability of crash. 517 more planes of this model are still in operation in poor countries. About 30- year-old Boeing 737 JT8D, that was in operation by Itek Air company, crashed not far from Bishkek in August 2008. 68 people died in that crash.

Interesting article, as far as it goes....The first generation B737 are now at least 30 years old, and has become the "aircraft of choice" for a good many cheap operators (as opposed to low-cost operators), and a good many of those have "lower than optimal" operating and maintenance procedures.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

Water just got thicker for Boeing:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49591363

I can't help but ponder how many other civil aviation (certification) authorities will point in which direction.

---

Bob Smith
Member of Seti PIPPS (Pluto is a Planet Protest Society)
Somewhere in the (un)known Universe?

TBH, was expecting something along those lines. The FAA has a tough future in restoring its reputation & that will cause many issues for all US aircraft manufacturers.
TBH, they only have themselves to blame.

TBH, was expecting something along those lines. The FAA has a tough future in restoring its reputation & that will cause many issues for all US aircraft manufacturers.

Only one manufacturer, its name is Boeing.
Oh, you are thinking of the ones that build for the military? FAA not involved. (You did know all the others dropped passenger jets because there was no profit in them. So how does Boeing make a profit?)
Or perhaps the makers of the little 1-19 seat jobs, never were self certified and not certified as passenger revenue under the same rules.
https://thinkaviation.net/difference-between-part-91-121-135/

TBH, they only have themselves to blame.

https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/09/06/us/florida-american-airlines-mechanic-faces-sabotage-charge/index.html

A mechanic for American Airlines was arrested Thursday and accused of trying to sabotage a commercial airliner shortly before it was set to take off from Miami International Airport for the Bahamas with 150 people on board.

Abdul-Majeed Marouf Ahmed Alani has been charged with "willfully damaging, destroying, disabling, or wrecking an aircraft, and attempting to do so," according to a criminal complaint filed in federal court.

Alani allegedly tried to damage or disable the aircraft's air data module (ADM) system, which reports aircraft speed, pitch and other critical data, on July 17.

https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/09/06/us/florida-american-airlines-mechanic-faces-sabotage-charge/index.html

A mechanic for American Airlines was arrested Thursday and accused of trying to sabotage a commercial airliner shortly before it was set to take off from Miami International Airport for the Bahamas with 150 people on board.

Abdul-Majeed Marouf Ahmed Alani has been charged with "willfully damaging, destroying, disabling, or wrecking an aircraft, and attempting to do so," according to a criminal complaint filed in federal court.

Alani allegedly tried to damage or disable the aircraft's air data module (ADM) system, which reports aircraft speed, pitch and other critical data, on July 17.

BBC version of this story

An American Airlines mechanic has been charged with damaging an aircraft in July as he was allegedly "upset" over stalled union contract negotiations.

The plane, with 150 people on board, was scheduled to fly from Miami to Nassau in the Bahamas on 17 July.

But it aborted take-off after the pilots received an error message about the flight computer.

Upon inspection, a piece of foam was found glued inside a navigation system part which stopped it from functioning.

...

The mechanics' union has been trying to secure a new contract with the airline as the company outsources more maintenance jobs in a bid to curb costs.

So, profit again comes into the equation. But at least the sequence 'error message - aborted take-off' means no lives were lost. This time.

So, profit again comes into the equation. But at least the sequence 'error message - aborted take-off' means no lives were lost. This time.

Better hackers, no message.

The Boeing Pinto 737.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USAir_Flight_427

USAir Flight 427 was a scheduled flight from Chicago O'Hare International Airport to Pittsburgh International Airport, with a final destination of West Palm Beach, Florida. On Thursday, September 8, 1994, the Boeing 737 flying this route crashed while approaching runway 28R of Pittsburgh International Airport, located in Findlay Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, which at the time was the largest hub for the airline.

After the longest investigation in the history of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), it was determined that the probable cause was that the aircraft's rudder malfunctioned and went hard-over in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots, causing the plane to enter an aerodynamic stall from which the pilots were unable to recover. All 132 people on board the aircraft were killed.

Investigators later discovered that the recovered accident rudder power control unit was much more sensitive to bench-tests than other new such units. The exact mechanism of the failure involved the servo valve, which remains dormant and cold for much of the flight at high altitude, seizing after being injected with hot hydraulic fluid that has been in continuous action throughout the plane. This specific condition occurred in fewer than 1% of the lab tests, but explained the rudder malfunction that caused Flight 427 to crash. The jam left no trace of evidence after it occurred and a Boeing engineer later found that a jam under this controlled condition could also lead to the slide moving in the opposite direction than that commanded. In light of this, Boeing felt that the test results were not real-world and not applicable due to the extremes under which the valve was tested. Boeing stated that the rudder reversal was more likely psychological, likening it to examples when a human panics and intends to step on the brake during an automotive accident, but accidentally presses on the gas pedal instead while under duress. The FAA's official position was that there was not enough evidence for probable cause of rudder system failure.

After the longest accident investigation in NTSB history — lasting more than four and a half years — the NTSB released its final report on March 24, 1999. The NTSB concluded that the accident was due to mechanical failure:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the USAir Flight 427 accident was a loss of control of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder surface to its blowdown limit. The rudder surface most likely deflected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots as a result of a jam of the main rudder power control unit servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide.

The FAA disagreed with the NTSB's probable cause verdict and Tom McSweeney, the FAA director of aircraft certification, issued a statement on the same day it was issued which read: "We believe, as much as we have studied this aircraft and this rudder system, that the actions we have taken assure a level of safety that is commensurate with any aircraft."

However the FAA changed its attitude after a special task force, the Engineering Test and Evaluation Board, reported in July 2000 that it had detected 46 potential failures and jams in the 737 rudder system that could have catastrophic effects. In September 2000 the FAA announced that it wanted Boeing to redesign the rudder for all iterations of the 737, of which there were then more than 3,400 in the USA alone.

Boeing maintained that the most likely cause of the crash was that the co-pilot inadvertently deflected the rudder hard-over in the wrong direction while in a panic and for unknown reasons maintained this input until impact with the ground. ... In 2016, former investigator John Cox stated that time so far has proven the NTSB correct in their findings due to the absence of a rudder reversal incident since Boeing's redesign.

I think that Boeing's middle & senior management should sit down & watch this video...
The truck that invented an industry
...they might learn something.

Worth reading, but with a warning, it is very long.

What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?

Malfunctions caused two deadly crashes. But an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage

Good read. Brings to mind that well mentioned quote: Pay peanuts, get monkeys...
...can monkeys fly?

Hmm...
...Banned from entering US & European air space as it's designated as an unsafe airline, Obama assists Boeing.

Banned from entering US & European air space as it's designated as an unsafe airline, Obama assists Boeing.

Left hand, Right Hand, Pilot, Co-Pilot. Missing politics disagree light, missing instruments disagree light.

However the report is 100% correct. Pilot error, caused by airline greed.

However the report is 100% correct. Pilot error, caused by airline greed.

And passenger selfishness.

Airbus forecasts that number of planes in sky will double in 20 years

Worth reading, but with a warning, it is very long.

What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?

Malfunctions caused two deadly crashes. But an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage

A goodly detailed read thanks.

The stark notes are the deadly compromises:

... Boeing’s reticence allowed a narrative to emerge: that the company had developed the system to elude regulators; that it was all about shortcuts and greed; that it had cynically gambled with the lives of the flying public; that the Lion Air pilots were overwhelmed by the failures of a hidden system they could not reasonably have been expected to resist; and that the design of the MCAS was unquestionably the cause of the accident.

But none of this was quite true. The rush to lay blame was based in part on a poor understanding not just of the technicalities but also of Boeing’s commercial aviation culture...

... The answer was that all of Lion Air’s accidents happened during takeoffs and landings and therefore at relatively low speed, either on runways or in their immediate obstacle-free vicinities...

... The rush took five years to complete. Boeing called the result the Max. To keep costs down, as with all previous iterations, the redesign had to lie within the original 1968 F.A.A. certification of the type and not be treated officially as a new airplane... Equally important was that it had to have the same flying characteristics. This was a regulatory necessity if the Max was to escape onerous reclassification as a new airplane. And there was a problem. Boeing test pilots discovered that the Max had unusual stall characteristics when the wing flaps were up and the engines were thrusting...

... Some at Boeing argued for an aerodynamic fix, but the modifications would have been slow and expensive, and Boeing was in a hurry. Its solution was to create synthetic control forces by cooking up a new automated system known as the MCAS to roll in a burst of double-speed nose-down stabilizer trim...

... And the Lion Air mechanics? He said: “They didn’t finish, whatever the log says. They didn’t do an adequate check of the systems.” If they had, in Goglia’s view, they would have seen that the unit was faulty. According to the official narrative, which — discounting its omissions — seems to be mostly true, when a fresh crew arrived to take the next run, a night flight 600 miles west to Jakarta, a technician showed the new captain the maintenance log and explained that the angle-of-attack sensor on the left side had been replaced...

... One of Boeing’s bewildering failures in the MCAS design is that despite the existence of two independent angle-of-attack sensors, the system did not require agreement between them to conclude that a stall had occurred. Inside the cockpit, none of the pilots knew any of this or had ever heard of the MCAS. To them the event must have looked like a runaway trim, much as Boeing had expected. But there were two differences that may have confused them. The first was the severity of the pitch-down trim...

... The captain formally declared a condition of urgency by making a “pan-pan” call to air-traffic control. He reported an instrument failure and asked to continue flying straight ahead... Finally the ghost in the jump seat intervened. It is impossible to know if he was a better airman than the pilots in the front or simply had the advantage of an overview. Either way, he recommended the obvious — shutting off the electric trim by flipping the cutout switches... Investigators do not seem to have explored why the pilots required nearly five minutes to handle what normally might have been a 30-second adventure, or why they required a cockpit guest to provide the solution...

... If true, it was hard to conclude anything other than that this was severe and grotesque negligence... They just checked the fault messages and cleared them and called it a day. That’s my best guess. They were just hellbent to release that airplane.”...

... It is hard to believe that any pilot entering that cockpit could have been so sloppy. But one thing is obvious: Throughout the subsequent fatal flight, neither member of the accident crew gave those [cutout] switches a thought...

... The Lion Air 610 accident crew — ... Instead, they thought they had a healthy airplane, and a nice new one, too...

... Suneja knew they had experienced some kind of runaway trim, but now with the flaps extended (and therefore with the unknown MCAS neutralized) it did not happen again. This would have been a good time to quit and go home. Instead, Suneja leveled at 5,000 and 30 seconds later ordered the flaps retracted...

... The MCAS was fast and relentless. Suneja could have disabled it at any time with the flip of the two trim cutout switches, but this apparently never came to mind, and he had no ghost in the jump seat to offer the advice. The fight continued for the next five minutes, during which time the MCAS mounted more than 20 attacks and began to prevail...

... so long as the pilots stayed in the fight. But panic was growing in the cockpit. What little the Indonesian investigators have said about the voice recordings, they have described that much. The air-traffic control record shows the same. Suddenly it was the captain, Suneja, who was on the radio, and his transmissions made little sense...

... The nose dropped farther as the stabilizer prevailed. The crew of an offshore oil platform saw the airplane in a nearly vertical dive before it hit the water...

... The MCAS as it was designed and implemented was a big mistake. It remains unclear exactly what went wrong at Boeing — who decided what, and why...

... The second accident occurred when Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, a 737 Max bound for Nairobi with 157 people aboard, hit the ground near Addis Ababa in a screaming dive...

... to activate the autopilot as a way of disabling the MCAS. The record shows four attempts in rapid succession to engage the autopilot, all of which were refused because autopilots are not recovery devices and will not engage if they sense pressures on the control column — meaning that an airplane is being flown out of trim... in apparent desperation to persuade the autopilot to engage, Getachew did the unthinkable and released his pressure on the control column. The column snapped forward, and the airplane responded by violently pitching down, 20 degrees below the horizon. Just then, with the stick shaker still rattling, the MCAS kicked in and achieved full nose-down trim, doubling the angle of the dive... the airplane hit the ground doing approximately 600 miles an hour. It buried itself into a 30-foot-deep crater in farmland...

... All signs are that the reintroduction of the 737 Max will be exceedingly difficult because of political and bureaucratic obstacles that are formidable and widespread. Who in a position of authority will say to the public that the airplane is safe?

I would if I were in such a position. What we had in the two downed airplanes was a textbook failure of airmanship. In broad daylight, these pilots couldn’t decipher a variant of a ... runaway trim, and they ended up flying too fast at low altitude...

... Furthermore, it is certain that thousands of similar crews are at work around the world, enduring as rote pilots and apparently safe, but only so long as conditions are routine ... Boeing has grown largely silent, perhaps as much at the request of its sales force as of its lawyers. To point fingers at important clients would risk alienating not only those airlines but others who have been conditioned to buy its airplanes, no matter how incompetent their pilots may be.



Phew! Quite a read and quite a depressing description of corrupt politics and business greed killing safety and safe flying. More of a question is what next?

An important part of that story is that the pilots were overwhelmed by the unexpected circumstances so much so as to start to panic. Also, they seem to have been trained (or pressured?) to 'press on regardless' rather than to turn back or divert...


All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
The Future is what We all make IT (GPLv3)