Profits 1st, Safety 2nd?

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Message 1994813 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 0:35:26 UTC - in response to Message 1994807.  

I don't believe your son write documentation that fully explain what the code does and how it works in detail.
Been in the business more than 30 years and never seen such documentation.
Usually the documentation is the same that was given to the coder before he even started to code.
But there is of course as an example the BOINC project with documented code (in English) for calculating "CreditNew".
How many understand that? Certainly only the author.
https://boinc.berkeley.edu/trac/wiki/CreditNew
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Message 1994821 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 2:05:08 UTC - in response to Message 1994813.  

I don't believe your son write documentation that fully explain what the code does and how it works in detail.
Been in the business more than 30 years and never seen such documentation.
Usually the documentation is the same that was given to the coder before he even started to code.
But there is of course as an example the BOINC project with documented code (in English) for calculating "CreditNew".
How many understand that? Certainly only the author.
https://boinc.berkeley.edu/trac/wiki/CreditNew

Crystal clear. However it is written for a person who can read C++, not a secretary. That is the issue. Documentation of code for coders isn't the issue. Documentation of the entire program for the end user is the problem. So documentation like credit new isn't going to help a CPA when he wants to run a depreciation schedule.
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Message 1994835 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 5:51:25 UTC

So documentation like credit new isn't going to help a CPA when he wants to run a depreciation schedule.
I guess that that would depend on how much depreciation you want as CreditScrew will supply endless amounts. :-D

Cheers.
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Message 1994860 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 14:18:01 UTC - in response to Message 1994807.  

At my son's company they write the documentation, in English not geek speak, at the same time as the code. Because on large projects it can be months before it is fully tested or even longer if discovered by a user, and probably by that time the programmer has forgotten all about it or is no longer there.
For the only software I've ever written for commercial release (by a charity), we worked like that. I was solely responsible for the code, but we had a professional author to write the manual - and he pointed out the idiocies in my user interface coding as we went along. The final product was much benefited by the close, but non-technical, scrutiny.

The other vivid memory I have is of the public launch of the finished product. I was on keyboards, stage right of one of the grander meeting rooms in Wakefield Town Hall. My computer monitor was hooked up to one of those triple-lens Barco projectors, and everything the computer output was displayed on a cinema screen for all to see. That concentrates a programmer's mind...

In the Boeing Max case, I see that "Boeing has not formally submitted the software fix to the FAA" and "The FAA is expected to conduct a certification flight in the coming weeks". I think every spare seat on that flight should be filled by a member of the MCAS programming team - with the project leader in the cockpit jump seat.
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Message 1994868 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 15:35:54 UTC - in response to Message 1994860.  

At my son's company they write the documentation, in English not geek speak, at the same time as the code. Because on large projects it can be months before it is fully tested or even longer if discovered by a user, and probably by that time the programmer has forgotten all about it or is no longer there.
For the only software I've ever written for commercial release (by a charity), we worked like that. I was solely responsible for the code, but we had a professional author to write the manual - and he pointed out the idiocies in my user interface coding as we went along. The final product was much benefited by the close, but non-technical, scrutiny.

The other vivid memory I have is of the public launch of the finished product. I was on keyboards, stage right of one of the grander meeting rooms in Wakefield Town Hall. My computer monitor was hooked up to one of those triple-lens Barco projectors, and everything the computer output was displayed on a cinema screen for all to see. That concentrates a programmer's mind...

In the Boeing Max case, I see that "Boeing has not formally submitted the software fix to the FAA" and "The FAA is expected to conduct a certification flight in the coming weeks". I think every spare seat on that flight should be filled by a member of the MCAS programming team - with the project leader in the cockpit jump seat.

Actually, I'd rather see the team that designed and built the Angle of Attack sensors on that flight. There is that old adage GIGO.
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Message 1994881 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 18:10:25 UTC - in response to Message 1994868.  
Last modified: 23 May 2019, 18:18:29 UTC

[...]

In the Boeing Max case, I see that "Boeing has not formally submitted the software fix to the FAA" and "The FAA is expected to conduct a certification flight in the coming weeks". I think every spare seat on that flight should be filled by a member of the MCAS programming team - with the project leader in the cockpit jump seat.

The MCAS software may well be correctly exactly as specified.

The responsibility is with the system designers, and secondly the Management hustling all that through without adequate review or testing, and thirdly the FAA for not adequately overseeing that, all to fatal consequences...

So yes, have all those responsible and especially the management in on that first test flight. However, the 3rd seat in the cockpit is better occupied by a test pilot to oversee the other (busy) pilots doing the flying.

The Lion Air flight that survived the faulty MCAS prior to the deadly next flight survived due to the very rapid intervention of an off-duty 3rd pilot that was riding the 3rd seat. His oversight and knowledge of MCAS was able to diagnose the circumstances and instruct accordingly. The two pilots would be too badly hard worked saving the aircraft moment by moment to have the luxury for a pause for thought for what was happening. Note again that the MCAS goes against all their training and experience.



Actually, I'd rather see the team that designed and built the Angle of Attack sensors on that flight. There is that old adage GIGO.

It is interesting how the failure of the Angle-of-Attack sensor has largely escaped the spotlight of all the news.

Are not ALL Boeing 737 afflicted with the same AoA sensors?... Have there been any directives about those sensors??


Another significant line from the BBC article "Boeing 737 Max: FAA says no fixed timetable for grounding to be lifted":
The FAA has said that the issue of whether to make pilot training on 737 Max simulators a requirement before the plane can return to service is "still under review". ... Mr Gabriel told the BBC: "The big thing is that the simulators had not anticipated the Mcas. Pilots didn't know about it and if the authorities decide that all pilots have to be trained in a simulator that [could] cause a very big delay."...



All in our only one world,
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Message 1994888 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 19:08:40 UTC - in response to Message 1994881.  

Actually, I'd rather see the team that designed and built the Angle of Attack sensors on that flight. There is that old adage GIGO.

It is interesting how the failure of the Angle-of-Attack sensor has largely escaped the spotlight of all the news.

Are not ALL Boeing 737 afflicted with the same AoA sensors?... Have there been any directives about those sensors??

I doubt they are the same, because of the longer body of the plane they would have to be designed specifically for that.

As to why they have escaped the press, it is much easier to write speculative damnation about software than to get into technical details of an airflow sensor and Bernoulli's principle.

Unfortunately because of that the root cause of these disasters may never see the light of day.
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Message 1994895 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 19:56:55 UTC - in response to Message 1994888.  
Last modified: 23 May 2019, 21:08:55 UTC

Actually, I'd rather see the team that designed and built the Angle of Attack sensors on that flight. There is that old adage GIGO.

It is interesting how the failure of the Angle-of-Attack sensor has largely escaped the spotlight of all the news.

Are not ALL Boeing 737 afflicted with the same AoA sensors?... Have there been any directives about those sensors??

I doubt they are the same, because of the longer body of the plane they would have to be designed specifically for that. ...

Nope. I very much doubt that. Can you back up your claim of different AoA sensors across the 737s?...


I would expect the AoA sensors to be exactly the same across at least the Boeing 737 MAX and the Boeing 737 NG. Likely also way back through to the original 737.

Such parts tend to stay unchanged for decades due to high reliability and the onerous costs of reproving and recertification for any changes...


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Message 1994896 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 20:04:09 UTC - in response to Message 1994888.  

Unfortunately because of that the root cause of these disasters may never see the light of day.
The Root Cause was "Profits 1st".
The 737 series is the highest-selling commercial jetliner in history.
The 737 was revised again in the 2010s for greater efficiency, with the 737 MAX series featuring CFM LEAP-1B engines and improved winglets.
The 737 design is now 55 years old & has done extremely well with all the upgrades & technological improvements. However like everything else, the time comes when a new design is required.

Rather than take that path, Boeing took the path of least cost.
The 737 has been continuously manufactured since 1967; the 10,000th was rolled out on March 13, 2018, a MAX 8 destined for Southwest Airlines, and over 4,600 orders are pending.
Fiduciary Duty is all good & well, but where the transport industry is concerned FD should never be allowed to override Safety.
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Message 1994909 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 21:03:50 UTC - in response to Message 1994895.  

I would expect the AoA sensors to be exactly the same across at least the Boeing 737 MAX and the Boeing 737 NG. Likely also way back through to the original 737.
Airplanes aren't cars and the sensor is in the slipstream. Any change in the shape of the airplane will change the slipstream and that will require a new certification. The part in the wind has to balance and that could vary by a gram because of different air pressure at the location of the sensor on the outside of the fuselage. Now if you were talking about the galley cart hold down, that is likely unchanged and AirBus likely uses it too.

As I'm not a Boeing customer, I can't check their online parts catalog.
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Message 1994912 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 21:14:14 UTC - in response to Message 1994909.  
Last modified: 23 May 2019, 22:10:16 UTC

I would expect the AoA sensors to be exactly the same across at least the Boeing 737 MAX and the Boeing 737 NG. Likely also way back through to the original 737.
Airplanes aren't cars and the sensor is in the slipstream. Any change in the shape of the airplane will change the slipstream...

If that is what you are basing all your assumptions on, then indeed you are still wrong.

The AoA sensors are on the nose of the aircraft just below the pilots' windows, precisely to avoid any problems of the slipstream varying due to airframe effects...

[edited]


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Message 1994921 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 22:22:43 UTC

Angle of Attack issues
A good article but has one worrying issue for me:
But potential complications arise with how software interprets what the sensor tells it.
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Message 1995066 - Posted: 24 May 2019, 21:42:54 UTC

I still think you guys can't see the forest for the trees.

While the whole MCAS, sensor, and pilot training debate is quite interesting I've yet to see an explanation of WHY all that crap was necessary in the first place.

I very much doubt an Adrian Newey (fictional example) would have ever signed off on a design like this.
Is it so hard to understand that you kinda have to design the whole plane around the NEW engines?
This is blatant franken-engineering and I sure as hell ain't putting my daughter on one of those things. Ever.

- - - - - - - - -

" So we made the chassis longer this year because of new regulations but had to move the new bigger, heavier, more fuel-efficient engine towards the back of the car. Now that DOES make the car wanna do a Mark-Webber-in-Valencia style lift off... but we've got an app and a couple of sensors that'll fix it. Mostly. "
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Message 1995107 - Posted: 25 May 2019, 1:05:25 UTC - in response to Message 1995066.  

I still think you guys can't see the forest for the trees.
Not quite...
The 737 design is now 55 years old & has done extremely well with all the upgrades & technological improvements. However like everything else, the time comes when a new design is required.
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Message 1995109 - Posted: 25 May 2019, 1:19:03 UTC - in response to Message 1995107.  

Hehe, apologies Sirius. It was unfortunate my post was right underneath yours. I can see how it almost looks like a direct reply.

But worry not, I know your not in the group I'm referring to. And I know that because you said:
The Root Cause was "Profits 1st".


:)
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Message 1995116 - Posted: 25 May 2019, 2:17:34 UTC

Reports say that foreign regulators, after the meeting in Fort Worth on Thursday, say the Boeing and the FAA are moving too fast.
United said Friday it has extended the delay through Aug. 3.
There is also confirmation that Ethiopian Airlines do have a simulator, but it is not configured to simulate the MCAS operation.

And I don't understand why it is going to take 100 to 150 hours/plane to do the modifications. I was lead to believe it was a software change and install the indicator to show AoA sensor disagreement, where i was also lead to believe the cabling was already in place so it could be installed, originally as a paid for, after market upgrade.
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Message 1995128 - Posted: 25 May 2019, 4:43:01 UTC - in response to Message 1995116.  

Reports say that foreign regulators, after the meeting in Fort Worth on Thursday, say the Boeing and the FAA are moving too fast.
United said Friday it has extended the delay through Aug. 3.
There is also confirmation that Ethiopian Airlines do have a simulator, but it is not configured to simulate the MCAS operation.

And I don't understand why it is going to take 100 to 150 hours/plane to do the modifications. I was lead to believe it was a software change and install the indicator to show AoA sensor disagreement, where i was also lead to believe the cabling was already in place so it could be installed, originally as a paid for, after market upgrade.

@WK, the time is for the paperwork to be completed, not the actual work. I'm only being partly facetious. If they have to get behind the instrument panel to connect cable, there may be several things in the way that need to be moved or disconnected and reconnected. All of it will have to be tested to be sure every other system was put back in place correctly. Then comes the paperwork and signatures.

@ML, http://www.modernairliners.com/boeing-737/boeing-737-specifications/ You will note that the height and width of the fuselage is different from classic to nextgen. One obvious consequence of that is the nose cone will have a different shape. Obviously the AOA sensor which bolts on will have to match that shape. Hence it will be different, ignoring any other difference in slipstream. Finally the reason the sensors are so far forward isn't to avoid any slipstream, it is to put them in front and well above the landing gear and landing gear door. You don't want the reading to change when the gear is deployed or retracted. It isn't to make them the same from design to design. Back when the classic 737 was certified I'm sure there was an air data probe on the plane and its measurements were compared to the AOA sensors to calibrate them. For the Max-8 they might have tried to do that calibration with a software simulation rather than fly a test airplane. Yet another place to introduce error.
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Message 1995492 - Posted: 27 May 2019, 19:36:48 UTC

Garry - I suggest you re-read those specs.
The fuselage height & width have remained constant since "day 1" on the 737 at 4.01m & 3.76m respectively.

AOA sensors are positioned where they are, in "smooth" air, out of the way of potential FOD, ground crew "interference, engine intake effects.
Just about every "large" aircraft has similar devices fitted, but not all of them are used in and "active" manner. The b737Max joins the a32x family in having them used in an active manner, in that they can "contribute to the control of the aircraft during certain flight stages". As I said in an earlier post the a32x family has three employed in a redundant voting pattern - if there is disagreement between any pair of sensors then there is "round robin" to work out which one is out of line, the pilots are alerted to there being a discrepancy, and they are now operating in a degraded mode; a second discrepancy isolates the system, and tells the pilots that they are in "seriously degraded mode", but the flight may be completed with the pilots doing the work of keeping the aircraft in trim (I think they also have to adopt a flatter, faster approach to ensure they are clear of the stall envelope which could well rule out some airports....)

Why such a long time to install the fix? In my mind the >100hrs to fix each aircraft suggests something else has crawled out from the wood-work. However there some potentially significant wiring changes. As I understand it isolating the MCAS system using the pilots' switches cuts the power to the motor(s) that drive the stabiliser jack(s). Thus some of the power wiring will have to be modified, and that may well have impacts on power routing, distribution etc. And of course every single wire change has to be inspected, tested and documented and signed for. There is no doubt in my mind that for the first few aircraft the FAA, CAA and other "interested parties" will want to look over the technicians' shoulders as well.

And who is going to pick up the tab??? Ultimately it will be us, "the flying public" in higher fares.
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Message 1995494 - Posted: 27 May 2019, 20:06:15 UTC - in response to Message 1995492.  

As I understand it isolating the MCAS system using the pilots' switches cuts the power to the motor(s) that drive the stabiliser jack(s).
That is the overriding issue I have with this matter. WHY is disabling MCAS allowing an essential component of any aircraft to force the flight crew into exerting themselves & spending TIME on trimming the aircraft. TIME which has shown they did not have. TIME which was seen clearly in the Miracle on the Hudson, the flight crew did not have.

How many people worldwide can comfortably control a fully laden vehicle should they lose all power steering?
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Message 1995500 - Posted: 27 May 2019, 20:40:37 UTC - in response to Message 1995492.  

Garry - I suggest you re-read those specs.
The fuselage height & width have remained constant since "day 1" on the 737 at 4.01m & 3.76m respectively.

English units are quoted differently 13Ft 2In height vs 12Ft 2In.
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