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Message 1994644 - Posted: 21 May 2019, 22:56:26 UTC

I'm sure I watched a "60 minutes Australia" episode on this which explained how in their haste to beat Airbus, Boeing just shoved the new engines in any old place they'd fit. A corporate decision obviously... Am I allowed to use the word "psychopath" now? :P

I can't find it but here's another clip from that episode:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OxPsxmU_ocI
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Message 1994712 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 10:22:51 UTC - in response to Message 1994644.  
Last modified: 22 May 2019, 10:23:37 UTC

Mmmm... Thanks for that.

Is this totally another case of "A rush to profits over and above safety"?


YouTube:

How 737 MAX 8’s design history could have influenced the Ethiopian Airlines crash


And STILL, you get the Marketing mantra about supposedly the "safest plane in the air"... As though their present design/development/build/test systems have not just completely killed two entire planes of crew and passengers...

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Message 1994714 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 11:36:43 UTC - in response to Message 1994644.  
Last modified: 22 May 2019, 11:43:22 UTC

I'm sure I watched a "60 minutes Australia" episode on this which explained how in their haste to beat Airbus, Boeing just shoved the new engines in any old place they'd fit. A corporate decision obviously... Am I allowed to use the word "psychopath" now? :P

I can't find it but here's another clip from that episode:
Terrifying final minutes of doomed Boeing 737 Max | 60 Minutes Australia

That clip gives part of the story. Note that the demonstration is shown from a good altitude and for a benign practice demonstration. There's a lot of missing detail...

These following YouTube clips give more of the story:

How 737 MAX 8’s design history could have influenced the Ethiopian Airlines crash - CBC News

Lion Air Cockpit Voice Recorder Reveals Pilots’ Frantic Search For Fix | TODAY

Could US pilots have saved the 737 MAX8 ? - Prof Simon

Boeing max 8 Test Pilots - Prof Simon


Do you believe (can you believe) the Boeing CEO in that last clip?...


So... How did all that happen?

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Message 1994715 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 11:50:08 UTC - in response to Message 1994618.  
Last modified: 22 May 2019, 11:50:47 UTC

They panicked and lost sight of their first job, to fly the plane.

[...]

I'd expect the MCAS runaway recovery procedure to: 1) turn MCAS off and keep it off! 2) reduce speed to maneuvering speed (or less) 3) manually trim the aircraft. 4) continue normal flight without electric trim. 5) inform Company and ATC of issue.

Sounds like good speculation...

See:

Could US pilots have saved the 737 MAX8 ? - Prof Simon


All rather damning...

So how did Boeing fly such a deadly thing?...

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Message 1994722 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 12:43:35 UTC

Is This the Result of Bad Software?
Linux or Windows?
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Message 1994734 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 13:20:42 UTC

It is "educational" to understand that MCAS was intended to allow b-737Max family to handle "the same as" the b737NG and b737Classic aircraft, thus saving the airlines having to train pilots, and keep pilots current on both the older and "new" aircraft, and allow all three generations to be classified as "the same" as far as pilots were concerned.
Great in theory....
This was because b737Max a physically much bigger engine than its predecessors, an engine so big it wouldn't fit under the wing of the very low slung b737 family. There were two possible solutions - move the engine up and forward, or extend the undercarriage. The latter would probably have meant a not inconsiderable redesign of the whole airframe, the latter just meant that under some very specific flight conditions there would be a tendency for the aircraft to adopt a nose-high attitude in a manner very dis-similar to its predecessors in the same flight mode, and MCAS was seen as the "sensible solution", and so a system was required to overcome this.
When working correctly MCAS does a very good job of making the b737Max behave sufficiently similar to a b737Classic that a specific type rating is not required. When turned off the b737 flies "quite happily" and controllably, even if a bit nose high during climb-out.
BUT as we now know MCAS has a design flaw - it has two sensors, but used only one of them by default - there was no "sanity check" which turned it off (and told the flight crew it was disabled) if there was a disagreement between the two.
This absence of sanity checking, but the absence of annunciation is even worse - the symptoms of a sensor failure were not always the same -so the flight crew had to dig through the manual (paper) to find a check list, and do that one, which may, or may not cure the problem. If it did they trick (no guarantee) then, depending on which check list they used they may be instructed to turn MCAS back on....... If it didn't then it was move onto another checklist and try again. All very well at 30,000ft, but on the climb-out from Addis - just not enough height and thus time....
All in all a great concept that was initially poorly implemented and has led to two total loss crashes, and a load of aircraft being grounded for a not months when initially it was suggested "the fix was nearly ready to fly". The fact there is a delay makes me think what else has been found?
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Message 1994736 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 13:33:48 UTC - in response to Message 1994734.  

If it didn't then it was move onto another checklist and try again. All very well at 30,000ft, but on the climb-out from Addis - just not enough height and thus time....
Good post. I snipped most of it leaving the quote above for a reason.
Can we get serious now?
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Message 1994740 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 14:20:53 UTC - in response to Message 1994722.  
Last modified: 22 May 2019, 14:30:49 UTC

Is This the Result of Bad Software?
Linux or Windows?

To me, that reads very much like what I imagine to be the 'Windows way' of things:
Rushed Release

I would bet that all engineers are familiar with rushed releases. We cut corners, make concessions, and ignore or mask problems - all so we can release a product by a specific date. Any problems are downplayed, and those that are observed by the customer can be fixed later in a patch.

Apparently, the 737 MAX was subject to the same treatment. Here are some key highlights from the article...


There is (and should be) no place for such 'management/Marketing silliness' in anything life impacting...

But also note, making "in the field" software fixes on a 'wing and a prayer' has become all-too-common a business practice to shove out incompletely developed product to then play a begrudging game of minimizing what is then 'fixed' AFTER the sale has been made...


One of the ongoing outcomes listed there is for the new training for the pilots:
In addition to the software changes, there are extensive training changes. Pilots will have to complete 21+ days of instructor-led academics and simulator training. Computer-based training will be made available to all 737 MAX pilots, which includes the MCAS functionality, associated crew procedures, and related software changes. Pilots will also be required to review the new documents...



However, that still to my mind leaves the very dangerous stall scenarios inherent in using the newly placed larger jet-fan engines on the Boeing 737 that are the source of the need for the deadly MCAS in the first place...

Primarily: The whole reason MCAS has proved so deadly is that it was designed to quickly move the flight trim by such a huge degree that the trim change completely overrode anything the pilots could do with their control column ('joystick'). That suggests that with a fault-disabled MCAS, there are then stall conditions for that plane from which it is impossible for a pilot to recover...


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Message 1994741 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 14:22:05 UTC - in response to Message 1994712.  
Last modified: 22 May 2019, 14:28:26 UTC

Is this totally another case of "A rush to profits over and above safety"?

Yes.

Waddayamean you designed a plane that may stall during take-off? That's an instant red card.
Or "one strike... you're out!" if ur American :)

Oh, oh! But I created an app for that!

Oh did you now? How cute.
Now go back and redesign your f*n plane.

I love how everybody is focusing on the "app" and have completely forgotten the age-old "back to the drawing board".

- - - - -

I created a car that drifts into the other lane. Sure I've got talented engineers that can fix the issue but those brainiacs would take forever. So I went to my other brainiacs and created an AI that no other car has because no other car needs. Way cheaper that way. Imma genius! And don't worry about the over 300 people I've killed. I've got a software update that'll fix it. Sort of. I mean the car will still want to drift into the other lane but immagonna show it who's boss!

Edit: hehe we were writing the same thing at the same time :)
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Message 1994746 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 14:34:24 UTC - in response to Message 1994734.  

... aircraft being grounded for a not months when initially it was suggested "the fix was nearly ready to fly". The fact there is a delay makes me think what else has been found?

The "What else?" is a very good question.

Time is needed for this one. And time is exactly what was being rushed (hustled?)...


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Message 1994747 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 14:49:20 UTC - in response to Message 1994736.  

If it didn't then it was move onto another checklist and try again. All very well at 30,000ft, but on the climb-out from Addis - just not enough height and thus time....
Good post. I snipped most of it leaving the quote above for a reason.
Can we get serious now?

He does... Very much so:

Captain "Sully" Sullenberger blasts Boeing and FAA in op-ed


The quoted "frustration" is an extremely professional understatement...

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Message 1994748 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 14:52:55 UTC

And the responses here, or rather the complete lack of any useful response, to my mind are deadly damning:


FAA head on whether Boeing 737 Max 8 safety features should have been mandatory



So, really? Safety is an optional cost-extra? And an extra profit for Boeing Sales/Marketing??

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Message 1994753 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 15:14:09 UTC - in response to Message 1994748.  

So, really? Safety is an optional cost-extra? And an extra profit for Boeing Sales/Marketing??
The failure of the FAA to require Airworthiness Directive 87-21-08 inspection of all the lap joints proposed by Boeing Alert Service Bulletin SB 737-53A1039; and the lack of a complete terminating action (neither generated by Boeing nor required by the FAA) after the discovery of early production difficulties in the B-737 cold bond lap joint which resulted in low bond durability, corrosion, and premature fatigue cracking.
That was part of the NTSB's conclusion to an incident that occurred 11,399 days ago. Not much changed in 31 years it seems.
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Message 1994756 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 15:59:23 UTC - in response to Message 1994715.  

They panicked and lost sight of their first job, to fly the plane.

[...]

I'd expect the MCAS runaway recovery procedure to: 1) turn MCAS off and keep it off! 2) reduce speed to maneuvering speed (or less) 3) manually trim the aircraft. 4) continue normal flight without electric trim. 5) inform Company and ATC of issue.

Sounds like good speculation...

So how did Boeing fly such a deadly thing?...

From https://embeddedartistry.com/blog/2019/4/1/what-can-software-organizations-learn-from-the-boeing-737-max-saga
Other pilots have struggled against the MCAS system and safely guided their passengers to their destination.

Not so deadly is it?

Until we have a real safety investigation that does not have a predetermined result to lay all blame on Boeing, we will continue to kill people.

That article makes the real point that documentation is more important than the code. Until the IT industry wakes up to that ... .
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Message 1994764 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 17:18:06 UTC

Sorry Garry, but Boeing have really dropped the balls on this one they should come clean and you should shut up defending the indefensible.

I've been talking to one of the team of senior pilots(*) involved in the potential re-certification of the b737Max for flying European airspace, he says, "Without MCAS it is a perfectly safe aircraft, but one with significantly different flying characteristics when compared to the earlier generations of the b737", and "That [without MCAS] those differences would have prevented the b737Max from being certified as type compatible with those earlier generations".
The truth is Boeing didn't tell airlines the all the facts about all failure modes of MCAS, because it "wasn't considered a safety system" - which if one looks at its design intent is true. HOWEVER, "nobody" considered the single-point failure that could lead to the MCAS system commanding, and authorising, the full "nose down" movement of the horizontal stabiliser, and yet it was obvious that this was a real potential failure mode given the very poor diagnostics available to the flight crew coupled with the very poor "conversion training" made available to the airlines (and possibly to other regulatory authorities). What was a "safety benign" system had become a "critical-safety affecting" system - meaning that while its main function was not one of safety, in certain failure modes it could critically affect the safety of an aircraft.

As has already been stated, MCAS failures presented as a number of potential other failures, and the in-flight checklists didn't help the diagnosis in the "hot" situation of MCAS very rapidly pushing the nose down. And for the Lion Air crash MCAS failures weren't even considered, just a bunch of "more common" failures. After Lion Air there was a minor change in the sequence of some of the checklists, but still not one that covered the whole range of symptoms - this was (is?) because some of the covered modes were considered more probable, and thus took higher priority in the list of lists.

Don't loose sight of the fact that MCAS was marketed as a "pilot aid", and not a safety system - the b737 is perfectly safe without MCAS, it just handles differently to it predecessors. In my opinion, the b737Max would be flying today if it hadn't had it installed and that the type approval system had considered it as a "different type" to other b737 models. As an aside b757, b767, b777, b787 have a similar flight characteristic to a b737Max without MCAS, but don't "need" such a system as they are different types. Also some (all?) the A32x family all have an "MCAS-like" system, but have a "proper" fault detection and announcement s set of functions, with redundancy and sanity checking in place, and have had it for a good few years.


(*) My contact only joined the team a few weeks before the Lion Air crash, having gone through a long training program as test pilot to become accredited as such for the various European civil aviation agencies (remember, not all European countries are members of the EU, and indeed most members of the EU have their own agencies) - his "day job" was as a b737 pilot for a major mainland Europe airline, but "out based" in the UK. Since that time he has all but stopped his day job, but has been fyling simulations of, first the Lion Air crash, but more recently the Ethiopian Airway crash, he reckons the Lion Air crew had maybe thirty seconds to save the aircraft when the second episode kicked in, but there was virtually no hope for the Ethiopian Airways crew due to Addis being so "hot and high", with such adverse terrain.
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Message 1994770 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 18:06:38 UTC - in response to Message 1994756.  
Last modified: 22 May 2019, 18:08:02 UTC

That article makes the real point that documentation is more important than the code. Until the IT industry wakes up to that ... .
The IT industry is aware of that.
Both the code and the documentation are equally important and both are prone to error.
But there can be errors in the documentation even if the code is correct and vice versa.
Finding those discrepancies can only be done by doing many tests that in this case is quite clear wasn't done enough.
Pilots know how to fly airplanes.
Aeronautical engineers know how airplanes fly.
Seldom do the twain meet.
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Message 1994799 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 22:19:51 UTC

@Rob, I'm not saying Boeing isn't the major party at fault. (They built another Ford Pinto.) Also I'm not the one saying that other pilots had issues with MCAS and were able to land safely to say Boeing is without fault, I just point that out to say that more needs to be looked at. I'm saying that by dismissing anything else you miss an important opportunity to find the rest of the weak links in the chain and missing them will bring down more airplanes because of it.

@moomin, The IT industry hasn't heard it yet. Lip service is all that is being paid to it. When some IT persons are held accountable in a civil or criminal court then and only then will some real attention be directed at the problem. Until then they will try and hide behind a no warranty clause, but that won't work with bodies piling up. Or put it this way, are classes on writing documentation a requirement for a BS in Computer Science?
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Message 1994806 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 23:06:42 UTC - in response to Message 1994799.  
Last modified: 22 May 2019, 23:17:26 UTC

Or put it this way, are classes on writing documentation a requirement for a BS in Computer Science?
Actually in most IT projects the code is the most reliable documentation.
The documentation is written after the code been tested but often you miss to test all possible outcome of the code.
And sometimes coders even write error output to a log like "This cannot happen" to what the coder think is an impossible outcome of the code. Sometimes it does anyway...
Been there, done that...

btw. You don't have to be a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science to test code.
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Message 1994807 - Posted: 22 May 2019, 23:43:49 UTC - in response to Message 1994806.  

Or put it this way, are classes on writing documentation a requirement for a BS in Computer Science?
Actually in most IT projects the code is the most reliable documentation.
The documentation is written after the code been tested but often you miss to test all possible outcome of the code.
And sometimes coders even write error output to a log like "This cannot happen" to what the coder think is an impossible outcome of the code. Sometimes it does anyway...
Been there, done that...

btw. You don't have to be a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science to test code.

At my son's company they write the documentation, in English not geek speak, at the same time as the code. Because on large projects it can be months before it is fully tested or even longer if discovered by a user, and probably by that time the programmer has forgotten all about it or is no longer there.
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Message 1994808 - Posted: 23 May 2019, 0:15:17 UTC - in response to Message 1994807.  

Or put it this way, are classes on writing documentation a requirement for a BS in Computer Science?
Actually in most IT projects the code is the most reliable documentation.
The documentation is written after the code been tested but often you miss to test all possible outcome of the code.
And sometimes coders even write error output to a log like "This cannot happen" to what the coder think is an impossible outcome of the code. Sometimes it does anyway...
Been there, done that...

btw. You don't have to be a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science to test code.

At my son's company they write the documentation, in English not geek speak, at the same time as the code. Because on large projects it can be months before it is fully tested or even longer if discovered by a user, and probably by that time the programmer has forgotten all about it or is no longer there.

Smart operation. Most places look as if the original was in geek speak in Chinese, translated to Roman, translated to Japanese, finally translated to English. Just like most instruction manuals. Upper management says get it out the door now. Documentation has not even been dreamed of. And the people who wrote the code and just before release date too busy fixing major issues to write documentation or sit down with a technical writer.

As to the code being the best documentation, moomin, do you expect the pilot who uses the code to be able to read it?!

There is a story about a famous couch at M$ when word first came out. It was reserved for tech calls for mail merge. The help desk knew that any call about mail merge was going to be that long! The documentation was written by programmers for programmers, not secretaries. [it is a very simple macro language so it made sense to them but not the people who had to use it]
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