I'm a capitalist. I own a quarter of Bahlsen, that's great. I want to buy a sailing yacht and stuff like that.

Another case of money talks, decency walks.

Boeing vice-president Mike Sinnett told the pilots: "No one has yet to conclude that the sole cause of this was this function on the airplane."
Later in the meeting, he added: "The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this, and the even worse thing would be another one."
"These guys didn't even know the damn system was on the airplane, nor did anybody else," said Mike Michaelis, head of safety for the pilots' union.

Boeing feeling the "pain"

Boeing has been working on a software fix for its flight system and is hoping for quick approval from regulators.

To put that in perspective, that was from many months BEFORE the second completely preventable fail:


Ethiopian Airlines crash: 'Pitch up, pitch up!'

Details have begun to emerge of the final moments of an Ethiopian Airlines flight which crashed three weeks ago.

An anti-stalling system on the plane, a Boeing 737 Max, has been blamed for the disaster which killed all 157 people on board.

Soon after take-off - and just 450ft (137m) above the ground - the aircraft's nose began to pitch down.

One pilot, according to the Wall Street Journal, said to the other "pitch up, pitch up!" before their radio died.

The plane crashed only six minutes into its flight...


Get out of that?... Really?...

The policy of greed and others' lives count for nothing?

All in our only one world,
Martin

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Later in the meeting, he added: "The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this, and the even worse thing would be another one."

To put that in perspective, from the many months BEFORE the second completely preventable fail

Indicative of a major cockup & rather than amend issues, cover them up?

Later in the meeting, he added: "The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this, and the even worse thing would be another one."

To put that in perspective, [that was] from the many months BEFORE the second completely preventable fail

Indicative of a major cockup & rather than amend issues, cover them up?

Worse than that, from my reading of their ongoing response, is that worse still, Boeing look to be playing a 'game' of obfuscate, spread the blame, claim anything and everything to try to somehow 'dilute' their own responsibilities and consequences to somehow try to 'escape' their what I can only see as deliberate malfeasance...

The FAA needs to be brought down to earth with them for their complicity...


From what I see, there is no safety culture there.

Is this the Boeing equivalent of the Deepwater Horizon disaster? Similar deadly rushed greed played out there...


All on our only one planet,
Martin

See:

Brittanica: Deepwater Horizon oil spill environmental disaster, Gulf of Mexico [2010]

Film: Deepwater Horizon (2016)

Film Review: Deepwater Horizon

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From what I see, there is no safety culture there.

Now why is that eerily familiar?

energy efficient & aesthetically pleasing.

Boeing completes 737 Max software upgrade

Form an orderly line to collect boarding cards for the test flight...

Boeing completes 737 Max software upgrade

Form an orderly line to collect boarding cards for the test flight...

Here's a very good clear reminder of what went wrong and the consequences:


What went wrong inside Boeing's cockpit?

There was nothing more the pilots could have done...


How can we trust that the same 'financial short cuts' pushed and rushed at the cost of safety and real lives are still not in play?...

All in our only one world,
Martin

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Oops, see previous post. :-)

Oops, see previous post. :-)

And a confusion of titles :-P

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In the rush to produce the new aircraft, he argued, critical safety features had been disregarded.
It is also being sued by some investors who claim the company concealed problems with the 737 Max and “effectively put profitability and growth ahead of airplane safety and honesty”.
In early May, Boeing admitted that a warning mechanism which should have been fitted as standard to the 737 Max would not work unless customers had also fitted a separate, paid-for cockpit display.
Yet some experts are concerned that these high standards are starting to slip, as airlines and manufacturers try to reduce the amount of time and money that needs to be spent on training.
Whittingham insists that "shareholders are squeezing airlines hard on costs”.

I believe a clear case of "Fiduciary Duty at work" is applicable here.

There was nothing more the pilots could have done...

BZZZZZT......

They could have remembered when they disconnected the auto-pilot that they also disconnected the auto-throttles. Their failure to pull back on the throttles caused the aircraft to pick up so much speed that they failed to be able to pull back on the controls. [I know Martin and the world doesn't want to hear truth] Their inexpiable turning the system back on to drive the trim further out of neutral was a factor. They had been trained on this system[1]. Their training either was inadequate or they failed to remember it. That part is on the airline. Boeing's part is in putting them in a situation where they needed to use training.

If the training was deficient ... who did the training? The Airline. Remember that is a Flag airline. Who owns Flag airlines? Why it is the same people who are writing the accident report! More fiduciary duty at work.

[1]That training should have included that the stick shaker would activate. To use reference to the artificial horizon to determine angle of attack. To remember the table in the aircraft manual on angle of attack and stall speed and to look at the airspeed indicator[2]. To remember that turning off a flight control system would disconnect other flight control systems such as the auto-throttles.

[2]Every pilot should know that before he is signed off on that type of aircraft be if from a piper cub to a space shuttle or A-380.

I'll end with this, as the cockpits become more and more glass the basic pilot skills become worse and worse. Instead of being a pilot they are a computer operator, so when, not it, the glass cockpit crashes so does the airplane.

Gary,

What plane(t) are you off? Please read through the excellent explanation on: What went wrong inside Boeing's cockpit?

To try to comment on your points... (Note that for legal purposes that I am completely unqualified and know nothing and that this is all my own uneducated random opinion...)

There was nothing more the pilots could have done...

BZZZZZT......

They could have remembered when they disconnected the auto-pilot that they also disconnected the auto-throttles. Their failure to pull back on the throttles caused the aircraft to pick up so much speed that they failed to be able to pull back on the controls. [I know Martin and the world doesn't want to hear truth] Their inexpiable turning the system back on to drive the trim further out of neutral was a factor. They had been trained on this system[1]. Their training either was inadequate or they failed to remember it. That part is on the airline. Boeing's part is in putting them in a situation where they needed to use training.

For the Ethiopian Airlines crash (totally fatal crash #2 for the Boeing 737 MAX), the pilots were at a perilously low altitude.

At such low altitudes, for all aircraft except military, as a pilot you are either on take-off, or committed to landing with a clear plan of where you are landing, or you are doing something to regain a safe altitude.

Gaining altitude requires increased throttle to power you upwards.

Quite correctly, manual intervention by the pilots will automatically disengage the autopilot and/or the auto-throttles accordingly. They would be completely aware of that.

So... For a fraught situation at low altitude, a completely understandable response is to increase the throttle to increase the power available to gain altitude.

The pilots had identified the trim was wrong and that the automatic trim control was defective. They faithfully followed Boeing's most recent instructions to mitigate and correct.

However, Boeing's instructions were ineffective (and I consider that they were deliberately fatally incomplete).

A feature of the electric trim drive is that it can act quickly. The manual control wheel (if the electric trim is deactivated) can take 100 full turns of a heavy wheel to pull back the trim to neutral. That takes a long time to turn.

The pilots had mere seconds to respond and correct which proved to be impossible for both pilots both working together on the controls.

If the training was deficient ... who did the training? The Airline. Remember that is a Flag airline. Who owns Flag airlines? Why it is the same people who are writing the accident report! More fiduciary duty at work.

No (Boeing 737 MAX MCAS) training was given being as there was no training in existence.

Further:

My reading of the circumstances are that Boeing deliberately contrived to keep the MCAS system 'secret' from the pilots and their airlines, deliberately so that Boeing could claim that no additional training or any different "Type Certification" was needed. Likely so that the Boeing Marketing could subsequently claim lower (more competitive) costs.

The consequences of that was that the pilots would be unaware of the MCAS system or of how it can go rogue. They were aware that their trim was being rapidly adjusted to their deaths by a 'phantom ghost' that they knew nothing about.

The pilots reported flight control problems and requested an emergency landing. They were able to fly (thankfully) outside of the nearby populated area. They never made it back to the airport.

[1]That training should have included that the stick shaker would activate. To use reference to the artificial horizon to determine angle of attack. To remember the table in the aircraft manual on angle of attack and stall speed and to look at the airspeed indicator[2]. To remember that turning off a flight control system would disconnect other flight control systems such as the auto-throttles.

[2]Every pilot should know that before he is signed off on that type of aircraft be if from a piper cub to a space shuttle or A-380.

All useless if the flight controls are operating differently to what Boeing has claimed and very different to what the pilots have ever before experienced.

I'll end with this, as the cockpits become more and more glass the basic pilot skills become worse and worse. Instead of being a pilot they are a computer operator, so when, not it, the glass cockpit crashes so does the airplane.

Which is precisely why we have (or should have...) peer reviewed certification.

The certification procedures appear to have been gamed into uselessness for this example. Scarily, is that also the case for other Boeing/FAA certifications?


From my understanding of how MCAS operates/operated, it is a critical flight function to overcome compromised flight handling characteristics. My very strong opinion is that both should never have left the ground...


All very unnecessarily deadly.

All in our only one world,
Martin

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Gary,

What plane(t) are you off? Please read through the excellent explanation on: What went wrong inside Boeing's cockpit?

To try to comment on your points... (Note that for legal purposes that I am completely unqualified and know nothing and that this is all my own uneducated random opinion...)

Then I suggest you and uninformed opinionated newspaper writers stop commenting.

Gaining altitude requires increased throttle to power you upwards.

Do you know what Vx and Vy are? And what are they for that type airframe?

Now what airspeed was the aircraft at?

See the issue now?

Flying is in many instances counter intuitive.

Do you know what Vx and Vy are? And what are they for that type airframe?

Now what airspeed was the aircraft at?

See the issue now?...

Please explain your ideas further?

Please explain the circumstances and consequences?


All in our only one world,
Martin

---

See new freedom: Mageia Linux
Take a look for yourself: Linux Format
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A technical treatise on aircraft & flight control is not necessary. Errors have been made which has cost lives. Errors which require serious scrutiny of Manufacturers, Aviation Authorities & Airlines. From what has been seen & heard to date, there is another issue that needs to be scrutinised by ALPA at least, how is it that some pilots were aware of MCAS & others were not?

Do you know what Vx and Vy are? And what are they for that type airframe?

Now what airspeed was the aircraft at?

See the issue now?...

Please explain your ideas further?

If you have ever been in the left front seat of an airplane they are fully explained.

Please explain the circumstances and consequences?

Vx is the best angle of climb speed.
Vy is the best rate of climb speed.

If you are either slower or faster than those speeds (which are different) then you aren't going to gain altitude as quick as possible.

Generally pilots want to fly at Vx on takeoff until they are a bit up in the air to make sure they clear buildings, towers, mountains, and the like. Once they are clear of those objects then they fly at Vy to climb to altitude to lessen drag and fuel burn. Once clear of the lower atmosphere they accelerate to a cruise climb airspeed.

You may also hear of V1, V2 and Vr. Those speeds apply while the airplane is rolling for takeoff. They vary on every flight depending on many factors, temperature, barometric pressure, runway surface, runway slope, weight of cargo and passengers.

There are also speeds at which you can deploy the wing flaps and lower the landing gear.

Finally there is Vne. In short Velocity Never exceed. If you do parts start falling off.

In the case you are talking about the plane was near to Vne, but you can't understand why I said pull back on the throttle.

Perhaps this last factoid, the slower the airplane is going the easier it is to move the control surfaces.

If you wish to comment more, I suggest taking a ground school class.

Vx is the best angle of climb speed.
Vy is the best rate of climb speed.

If you are either slower or faster than those speeds (which are different) then you aren't going to gain altitude as quick as possible.

Generally pilots want to fly at Vx on takeoff until they are a bit up in the air to make sure they clear buildings, towers, mountains, and the like. Once they are clear of those objects then they fly at Vy to climb to altitude to lessen drag and fuel burn. Once clear of the lower atmosphere they accelerate to a cruise climb airspeed.

You may also hear of V1, V2 and Vr. Those speeds apply while the airplane is rolling for takeoff. They vary on every flight depending on many factors, temperature, barometric pressure, runway surface, runway slope, weight of cargo and passengers.

There are also speeds at which you can deploy the wing flaps and lower the landing gear.

Finally there is Vne. In short Velocity Never exceed. If you do parts start falling off.

All very good context there, thank you.

Note you also need to add "(total) take-off weight" and "local terrain" in with your criteria...

In the case you are talking about the plane was near to Vne, but you can't understand why I said pull back on the throttle.

Perhaps this last factoid, the slower the airplane is going the easier it is to move the control surfaces.

Indeed so.

So... Why might the pilots have been near max airspeed?...

If you wish to comment more...

Please note that your repeated insults are completely unnecessary and merely suggests your lack of appreciation... ;-)



All in our only one world,
Martin

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See new freedom: Mageia Linux
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Quite a bombshell with this one...


Boeing admits 737 Max sims didn't accurately reproduce what flying without MCAS was like

Turning off trim control software in training wouldn't give realistic results – report...



That is one big OUCH!

And a complete deadly no-no...


All in our only one world,
Martin

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In the case you are talking about the plane was near to Vne, but you can't understand why I said pull back on the throttle.

Perhaps this last factoid, the slower the airplane is going the easier it is to move the control surfaces.

Indeed so.

So... Why might the pilots have been near max airspeed?...

They panicked and lost sight of their first job, to fly the plane.

I would be speculating, but it might be because the training part that the stick shaker would activate falsely didn't stick in their brains and they thought the aircraft was slow and near stall speed. -- the exact thing the failed sensor assumed -- A quick glance at the airspeed indicator would have dispelled that. A quick glance at the artificial horizon would also have shown that they were not at a too high angle of attack. They must have known that because they were trying to pull the nose up!

I'd expect the MCAS runaway recovery procedure to: 1) turn MCAS off and keep it off! 2) reduce speed to maneuvering speed (or less) 3) manually trim the aircraft. 4) continue normal flight without electric trim. 5) inform Company and ATC of issue.