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Rush Send message Joined: 3 Apr 99 Posts: 3131 Credit: 302,569 RAC: 0 |
Prostitution Insurance By Arnold Kling : 15 May 2007 Once upon a time in America, an employer came up with an idea for saving on payroll expenses. He noticed that many of his employees seemed uncomfortable with the idea of paying for sex, even though they wanted it. So he tried reducing worker salaries by $1000 a month, and instead he gave his workers an insurance card that they could present to prostitutes whenever the workers wanted their services. Paying for the card cost only $500 a month per worker, so the employer made higher profits. A few years later, a major war broke out, and the government put limits on worker salaries. Employers were unable to give raises. Instead, many employers copied the idea of prostitution insurance, and the government winked, allowing employers to circumvent the salary limits. After the war was over and salary limits were lifted, the practice of offering prostitution insurance remained widespread. In part, this was because income tax rates were now higher than they had ever been, and prostitution insurance was an untaxed fringe benefit. Two decades after the war, a President with a compassionate agenda won a landslide re-election victory. He delivered on campaign promises to use taxpayer funds to provide prostitution insurance to the poor and to the elderly. Both consumers and the providers of prostitution services became accustomed to using insurance cards. Paying for sex directly was frowned upon as something no decent, middle-class person would do. Instead, the first thing that would happen when a consumer visited a brothel or a prostitute was that the consumer would present his insurance card to be photocopied. Over time, prostitution became increasingly sophisticated and expensive. Scientists and engineers developed expensive new sex toys, and highly-paid specialists grew to outnumber ordinary general prostitutes. Nonetheless, not everyone was happy. Some consumers were not employed by companies offering prostitution insurance, nor were they eligible for government-provided prostitution insurance. Sometimes, these consumers would show up at brothels and expect free sex, with the cost shifted to other consumers. There was a market for individual prostitution insurance, but it never really developed properly. Many consumers were willing to remain uninsured, and insurance companies saw little opportunity to profit from this small market. The cost of employer-provided prostitution insurance continued to rise. It began to eat up a larger and larger portion of potential salary increases. Both employers and employees became troubled by this trend. Many people began to agitate for universal, government-provided prostitution insurance, arguing that such systems were working in Canada and in many European countries. Such a single-payer system for prostitution would solve the growing problems of the uninsured and relieve the strains of employer-provided prostitution insurance. Most importantly, it would allow people to continue to be insulated from having to pay for sex. Unfortunately, shifting the costs of prostitution insurance to taxpayers was fiscally impossible. Prosticare, the government's popular insurance program for the elderly, was projected to run into deficits of tens of trillions of dollars in another 50 years. Forestalling such a bankruptcy was going to require drastic cuts in future benefits. Trying to expand Prosticare to cover everyone would have forced such cuts to take place today, and no politician wanted to risk a confrontation with senior citizens. So although politicians talked a lot about universal single-payer prostitution coverage, they never seriously proposed enacting it. The American public had grown accustomed to enjoying unlimited access to the services of prostitutes. They continued to be averse to paying directly for sex, and they had become increasingly insulated from having to do so. As a result, America's share of GDP going to prostitution, already the highest in the world, rose rapidly. A few economists argued that Americans ought to try to get over their discomfort with paying for sex. The economists proposed that Americans pay for prostitution with their own money, in which case they would be less likely to obtain unnecessary services. In addition, consumers would pay more attention to cost, which would force prostitutes to lower their prices in order to avoid losing business. Most people, particularly prostitutes, were outraged by the economist's suggestions. The idea of paying for sex was too offensive to contemplate. So the existing prostitution insurance system kept stumbling along. Arnold Kling is the author of Crisis of Abundance: Re-thinking How We Pay for Health Care, published by the Cato Institute. Cordially, Rush elrushbo2@theobviousgmail.com Remove the obvious... |
Jeffrey Send message Joined: 21 Nov 03 Posts: 4793 Credit: 26,029 RAC: 0 |
The American public had grown accustomed to enjoying unlimited access to the services of prostitutes. Umm... Isn't prostitution illegal in this part of the world? Not to mention, immoral... At least it was up until the webcam came along... ;) It may not be 1984 but George Orwell sure did see the future . . . |
Dark Angel Send message Joined: 26 Aug 01 Posts: 432 Credit: 2,673,754 RAC: 0 |
Ok now that was creative...but the Cato Institute needs to get their collective minds out of the gutter. (think tank...I think not) Then again it does make a good argument for mail order prophylactics form Canada...ROFLMAO |
Rush Send message Joined: 3 Apr 99 Posts: 3131 Credit: 302,569 RAC: 0 |
Minimum Wage Laws: Economics versus Ideology By D.W. MacKenzie In recent years Republicans have proven their unreliability as proponents of limited government, especially where Federal spending is concerned. However, Republicans have been fairly reliable when it comes to opposing minimum wage increases. The bad news is that the recent victory by House Democrats led to an increase in the national minimum wage. Institutional factors are now against opponents of minimum wages, and President Bush has proven himself unreliable as a defender of free markets once more. The good news is that factual evidence and logic remain on our side. We can win this debate, and this is a debate worth winning. Proponents of minimum wage increases see things differently, but when you examine their arguments carefully, it is clear that we are in a very strong position. For example, law professor Ellen Dannin makes some strong, but false, claims regarding the debate over minimum wage laws. [1] Dannin claims that opponents to minimum wage increases practice "economics-lite" and have been bought off by wealthy corporations in an effort to increase corporate profits. All evidence against minimum wages is, to her, fabricated by "right-wing think tanks." According to Dannin, right wingers "stretch facile and sterile ideas to fit all situations." The economics-lite of right wingers "are mere theories (in the pejorative sense of the word), and, unlike scientific theories, they have no evidence to support them." Given the contempt that Dannin exhibits towards her opponents, one would expect her to make a strong case. Examination of her arguments indicates otherwise. Dannin admits that ending minimum wage laws might increase employment, but "it is just as likely that the employer would keep the same number of workers and pocket the rest as profit." Ending minimum wage laws would cause wage reductions for some existing employees, but this in no way precludes the hiring of new low-productivity employees. Dannin obviously does not understand two simple facts: first, market wages are roughly equal to discounted marginal labor productivity; second, productivity varies from one worker to the next. Numerous studies and common sense confirm these facts. After all, who in their right mind would doubt that we differ as individuals? So when minimum wages fall, employers hire additional low-productivity workers. This is an eminently reasonable proposition, but Dannin dismisses it  without explanation. Dannin avoids discussing the marginal productivity theory of wages because it makes too much sense to be taken as "economics-lite." As for her contention that there is no evidence to support marginal productivity theory, Dannin needs to become better acquainted with the facts. The level of Dannin's ignorance on this subject is revealed by this statement: "The first and still most rigorous testing of the relationship between the minimum wage and unemployment was performed ten years ago by David Card and Alan Krueger, economists at Princeton University. Their book Myth and Measurement: The Economics of the Minimum Wage (1995) compiles the results of a number of empirical studies they performed." Both these claims are absurd to the point of being laughable. Economists have published hundreds of studies on minimum wages before Card and Krueger. See for example:
--"Teenage Employment Effects of State Minimum Wages." Arnold Katz The Journal of Human Resources V8 N2 (Spring, 1973), pp. 250–256 --Brozen, Yale. 1969. "The Effect of Statutory Minimum Wage Increases on Teen-age Employment." Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 12 (April): 109–122 --"Recent Department of Labor Studies of Minimum Wage Effects." George Macesich; Charles T. Stewart, Jr. Southern Economic Journal V26, N4 (Apr., 1960), pp. 281–290 --"The Marginal Productivity Theory of Wages and Disguised Unemployment." Dipak Mazumdar The Review of Economic Studies V26 N3 (Jun., 1959), pp. 190–197 --"The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation." George J. Stigler The American Economic Review V36 N3 (Jun., 1946), pp. 358–365
Cordially, Rush elrushbo2@theobviousgmail.com Remove the obvious... |
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